Demystification of the Swiss Banking Secrecy and Illumination of the United States-Swiss Memorandum of Understanding by Honegger, Peter C., Jr.
NORTH CAROLINA JOURNAL OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
COMMERCIAL REGULATION
Volume 9 | Number 1 Article 3
Winter 1983
Demystification of the Swiss Banking Secrecy and
Illumination of the United States-Swiss
Memorandum of Understanding
Peter C. Honegger Jr.
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/ncilj
Part of the Commercial Law Commons, and the International Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in North Carolina
Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation by an authorized editor of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information,
please contact law_repository@unc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Peter C. Honegger Jr., Demystification of the Swiss Banking Secrecy and Illumination of the United States-Swiss Memorandum of
Understanding, 9 N.C. J. Int'l L. & Com. Reg. 1 (1983).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/ncilj/vol9/iss1/3
Demystification of the Swiss Banking Secrecy and
Illumination of the United States-Swiss
Memorandum of Understanding
by Peter C. Honegger, Jr.*
I. Introduction
The "Memorandum of Understanding" between American and
Swiss representatives was agreed upon to improve United States - Swiss
law enforcement cooperation in the field of insider trading.1 Repeated
cases of insider transactions in the United States gave rise to the present
"Memorandum of Understanding." Because these insider transactions
were made through Swiss banks, the investigations of the United States'
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) were repeatedly frustrated
by Swiss banking secrecy laws. Therefore, an understanding of the legal
background of the "Memorandum of Understanding" first requires in-
sight into Swiss banking secrecy law.
Although banking secrecy is not without limitations under Swiss
law, disclosure of the secrecy to foreign authorities can usually only be
granted based on a judicial assistance treaty. Two recent cases2 of in-
sider trading in the United States through Swiss banks raised the ques-
tion whether the banks can be compelled to reveal information to the
SEC under the existing assistance treaty between the two nations. In the
"Memorandum of Understanding" the countries ascertained the limited
applicability of their treaty and agreed upon a new procedure of lifting
the banking secrecy.
This article will discuss these facts and events, evaluate the new pro-
cedure, and point out a number of unsolved problems.
II. Provisions of the Swiss Banking Secrecy
"Banking secrecy" means that the banks must keep secret any infor-
mation about their clients regarding privacy and property, which they
* Associate, Law Firm Dr. Schuler, Zurich, Switzerland; lic. iur., University of Zurich
Law School 1981; LL.M. University of Virginia Law School 1983.
1 The negotiations took place in Bern, Switzerland on March 1 and 2, 1982, and in
Washington, D.C. on August 30 and 31,1982.
2 SEC v. Certain Unknown Purchasers of the Common Stock, and Call Options for the
Common Stock of Santa Fe Int'l Corp., [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
98,323 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 26, 1981); SEC v. Banca Della Svizzera Italiana, 92 F.R.D. 111 (1981).
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receive by practicing their business. This discretion applies to the banks'
officers, employees and any other persons with a direct relation to the
bank. The banker's discretion is based on three different legal concepts
under Swiss law: (1) personality rights; (2) contractual duties; and (3)
banking law that criminalizes secrecy violations.
Articles 27 and 28 of the Swiss Civil Code provide protection of per-
sonality rights.3 Article 28 permits a person who is illegally injured to
sue for relief.4 Natural and legal persons (z>e. corporate bodies) are pro-
tected. 5 The Swiss Federal Supreme Court has decided consistently that
the invulnerability of privacy is both a moral principle and an attribute
of personality protected by the law.6 Property is part of this privacy.
The duty of discretion applies to all persons who are given insight into
the privacy of others by their profession (ie. clergymen, lawyers, notaries,
physicians and bankers).
Even without express agreement, discretion is an implied contrac-
tual duty of the banker. This duty is a result of either the general law of
contract or the law of agency. In most cases, the relation between bank
and customer is governed by the law of agency. Here, the banker's dis-
cretion is part of his faithful and careful compliance with contractual
duties. 7 If the contract between the bank and the customer has no ele-
ments of agency, the banker's duty of discretion is a consequence of the
good faith principle and of usage.8 Even absent a contract between bank
and.client, the beginning of negotiations between the parties creates fac-
tual relations that have legal consequences; the banker has a general
duty of discretion based on the mentioned good faith principle of the
Swiss Civil Code.9
Article 47 of the Banking Law' 0 criminalizes secrecy violations. 1
The Banking Law, however, does not specify what constitutes a violation
of the banker's discretion. The notion of banking secrecy is defined solely
by private law through the implications of the personality rights and by
contractual duties.
3 Code Civil Suisse [C.C.] Arts. 27 and 28 (Switz.).
4 Article 28 of the Swiss Civil Code states: "Where anyone is being injured in his person
or reputation by another's unlawful act, he can apply to the judge for an injunction to restrain
the continuation of the act. An action for damages or for the payment of a sum of money by
way of moral compensation can be brought only in special cases provided by the law." Id at
Art. 28.
5 See C.C. Arts. 11, 12, 52, 53, and 54.
6 See, e.g., BG 97 II 97, 100, 102; BG 91 1200, 204; BG 44 11 319, 320. See also Comment,
Swiss Banks and Their American Chnts, 3 CAL. U. INT'L L.J. 37, 42 (1954).
7 Code des Obligations [C.O.] Art. 398(2)(Switz.).
8 The good faith principle is laid down in C.C. Art. 2(1). See Mueller, The Swiss Banking
Secret, 18 INT'L & COMP. L. Q. 360, 361 (1969).
9 See Mueller, supra note 8, at 361.
10 Bundesgesetz uber die Banken und Sparkassen of Nov. 8, 1934, as amended by Federal
Law of Mar. 11, 1971.
I See infia note 24 for text of Art. 47. Under Swiss law, the Banking Law is part of the
administrative law. Nevertheless it also has provisions of criminal law nature.
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Violations of banking secrecy laws may result in civil liability under
tort or contract law, or in criminal sanctions. The violation of the cli-
ent's personality rights gives rise to a tort action. ' 2 The client must prove
(a) the damages sustained by the banker's disclosure;
(b) negligence or willfulness of the banker;
(c) cause in fact and proximate cause, i.e. that the harm was caused
(foreseeably) by the disclosure; and
(d) the illegality of the disclosure, which is imminent absent either a
legal provision or a client's waiver permitting the bank to give
information to third persons or public authorities.13
If the particular seriousness of the injury and of the fault justify it, the
client also has a claim to a payment of money as reparation. 14 Action
can be brought against the bank itself which is liable for the torts of its
employees. 15
Since the banker's discretion is an implied contractual duty, disclo-
sure is an actionable breach of contract. 16 To establish the banker's lia-
bility the client has to prove:
(a) the damages sustained by the disclosure;
(b) breach of contract by the banker, Le. the disclosure; and
(c) cause in fact and proximate cause, ie. that the damages were
caused (foreseeably) by the disclosed information.17
There is a rebuttable presumption of fault against the banker. 18 As
under tort law, an action can also be maintained against the bank itself
which is liable for breach of contract by its employees. 19 Since the begin-
ning of negotiations imposes a duty of discretion on the banker,20 he is
liable under contract law even though no contract has yet been validly
agreed upon.2 1 Moreover, even if the parties ended their contract, the
12 Article 41 subsection I of the Swiss Obligation Code states: "Whoever unlawfully causes
damage to another, whether willfully or negligently, shall be liable for damages." C.O. Art.
41(1).
'3 See infia Section III.
14 C.O. Art. 49(1).
15 Article 55 subsection I of the Swiss Obligation Code reads: "The principal shall be
liable for damages caused by its employees or other auxiliary persons in the course of their
employment or official capacity, unless he proves that he has taken all precautions appropriate
under the circumstances in order to prevent damage of that kind, or that the damage would
have occurred in spite of the application of such precautions." C.O. Art. 55(1).
16 Article 97 subsection I of the Swiss Obligation Code provides: "If the performance of
an obligation cannot at all or not duly be effected, the obligor shall compensate for damage
arising therefrom, unless he proves that no fault at all is attributable to him." C.O. Art. 97(1).
17 C.O. Arts. 99(3), 42, 43, 44.
18 Id at Art. 97(1).
19 Article 101 subsection 1 of the Swiss Obligation Code states: "If an obligor, even
though authorized, has performed an obligation, or exercised a right arising out of a legal rela-
tionship, through an auxiliary person, such as a co-tenant or an employee, the obligor must
compensate the other party for any damages caused by the acts of the auxiliary person." C.O.
Art. 101(1).
20 See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
21 See Meyer, Swirs Banking Secrecy and Its Legal Implications in the United States, 14 NEw ENG.
L. REV. 18, 24 (1978).
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duty of discretion continues as long as the interest of the client demands
confidentiality.
Under Swiss law, personality rights are a fundamental principle of
law.2 2 They are, therefore, protected by both private law actions and by
criminal sanctions. Clergymen, lawyers, notaries, auditors and physi-
cians who divulge a client's secrets face imprisonment for between three
days and three years and/or a fine of up to 40,000.00 Swiss Francs. 2
3
Secrecy violations by bankers are criminalized by Article 47 of the Bank-
ing Law, 24 which does not provide undue sanctions. Intentional disclo-
sure of the banking secrecy is punishable by imprisonment between three
days and six months and/or a fine not exceeding 50,000.00 Swiss
Francs.2 5 Negligent failure of confidentiality is sanctioned by a fine of
up to 30,000.00 Swiss Francs. 26 Bankers face a much lower penalty than
the above mentioned professions.
The mystification of Swiss banking practices continues due to the
erroneous assumption that numbered or coded accounts receive special
treatment under Swiss law.2 7 Numbered accounts are subject to the
same legal provisions as all other kinds of accounts. The contents and
22 See supra notes 3-6 and accompanying text.
23 Article 321 of the Swiss Penal Code states:
Violation of Vocational Secrets:
1. Clergymen, attorneys, defenders, notaries public, secrecybound auditors ac-
cording to the Code of Obligations, doctors, dentists, pharmacists, midwives, and
their assisting personnel, who divulge a secret entrusted to them, or of which they
have become aware in their professional capacity, shall, on petition, be punished
by imprisonment or by a fine. Students who divulge a secret they have become
aware of during their study are punished as well. The violation of professional
secrecy remains punishable even after termination of the exercise of the profession
or after termination of the study.
2. The offender shall not be punished if he divulges the secret based on the
protected person's consent or, on the offender's request, on written authorization
by his superior or controlling authority.
3. Federal and Cantonal regulations concerning the obligation to testify and to
furnish information to a government authority shall remain reserved.
Code penal Suisse [C.P.] Art. 321.
24 Article 47 of the Swiss Banking Law reads as follows:
1. Whoever divulges a secret entrusted to him in his capacity as officer, em-
ployee, mandatory liquidator or commissioner of a bank, as a representative of
the Banking Commission, officer or employee of a recognized auditing company,
or who has become aware of such a secret in this capacity, and whoever tries to
induce others to violate professional secrecy, shall be punished by a prison term
not to exceed six months or by a fine not exceeding 50,000.00 francs.
2. If the act has been committed by negligence, the penalty shall be a fine not
exceeding 30,000.00 francs.
3. The violation of professional secrecy remains punishable even after termina-
tion of the official or employment relationship or the exercise of the profession.
4. Federal and Cantonal regulations concerning the obligation to testify and to
furnish information to a government authority shall remain reserved.
Banking Law, supra note 10, at Art. 47.
25 Id. at Art. 47(I).
26 Id. at Art. 47(2).




limits28 of the banking secrecy are exactly the same, whether the account
bears the client's name or is numbered.
The goal of coded accounts is to entrust as few bank employees as
possible with the holder's name by replacing a name with a number in
all correspondence between the bank and its customer. Coded accounts
are granted only if the depositor shows legitimate reasons for such protec-
tion, e.g. by his personage.29 Thus, the percentage of coded accounts is
small. 30 They are set up in the same manner as other bank accounts but
the bank takes precautions that the identity of the client remains un-
known to its employees. Generally, at a minimum, the management or
the regarding department of the bank knows the account holder's name.
Purely anonymous accounts do not exist in Switzerland. Numbered ac-
counts are nothing but an internal technical device to help banks avoid
secrecy violations by their employees. 3 1
Ill. Limits of the Banking Secrecy Under Swiss Law
The Swiss banking secrecy is not without limitations; both the will
of the client and legal limitations determine its scope. As a result of the
private law nature of the banking secrecy, the client, and not the bank, is
the master of the secret. 32 Thus, the client can ask the bank for any
information he may wish regarding his account, and he can authorize
the bank to furnish such information to third parties, especially to gov-
ernmental authorities. 33 As long as the customer does not act, however,
his wish for confidentiality must be presumed. 34
The Banking Law, which generally prohibits disclosure of the se-
crecy, provides that the Federal and Cantonal regulations concerning the
obligation to testify and to furnish information to a government author-
ity shall remain reserved. 35 Such government authorities can only be
domestic, not foreign. 36 The most important areas in which the banking
secrecy may be divulged to Swiss authorities are: (1) criminal proceed-
ings, (2) civil proceedings, (3) execution of debts and bankruptcy pro-
ceedings and (4) tax proceedings.
Switzerland is a confederation of twenty-six states, called "Can-
tons." 37 Criminal procedure is a field of chiefly Cantonal legislation.
28 See inyra Section III.
29 See generally Meyer, supra note 21, at 28 n.55.
30 Id.
31 See Mueller, supra note 8, at 362.
32 See Comment, supra note 6, at 42-43.
33 See Mueller, supra note 8, at 367.
34 Id. at 363.
35 See Banking Law, supra note 24, at Art. 47(4). There are also some legal provisions of
less importance restricting the banking secrecy between individuals. For a short overview, see
Meyer, supra note 21, at 29-30.
36 See Mueller, supra note 8, at 367.
37 The Swiss Confederation now has 26 Cantons and Half-Cantons. Where there is ambi-
guity, "Canton" means Canton or Half-Canton. C. HUGHES, THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION OF
SWITZERLAND at 3-4 (1954).
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The Federal Law of Criminal Procedure,38 as well as the Cantonal codes
of criminal procedure, settle the duty of third persons to testify and edit
documents of interest in criminal cases. Clergymen, physicians, lawyers,
and the accused are exempt.3 9 Bankers are not.40 Therefore, under
Swiss law, the banking secrecy is entirely cancelled in the field of crimi-
nal procedure.
Like criminal procedure, civil procedure is a field of mainly Can-
tonal legislation. The Federal Law of Civil Procedure4 t stipulates a pub-
lic duty of testimony from which bankers are not exempt. Therefore, on
the federal level, the banking secrecy is superseded. The Cantonal codes
of civil procedure establish the duty of third persons to testify and to edit
documents of interest in civil cases. As to the exemption of persons with
a professional duty of discretion, the Cantons are split into three groups.
Seven Cantons entitle all holders of professional secrets to refuse testi-
mony;42 seven Cantons empower the judge to decide whether the bank-
ing secret should be superseded in the particular case;4 3 and eleven
Cantons enumerate the persons who are entitled to refuse testimony and
edit documents because of their professional discretion. 44 Since bankers
are not listed by any of these eleven Cantons, they have to divulge the
banking secrecy. 45
The area of execution of debts and bankruptcy law is unified
throughout Switzerland by the Federal Bankruptcy Law.46 Under this
code, a debtor cannot avoid paying his debts by concealing his banking
accounts.4 7 Thus, the debt collection agency has a right of information
as far as is necessary to pay off the creditors. 48 In at least the later stages
of the attachment proceedings, the creditor has the right to information
about the nature and size of the attached property. Attachment is
granted, even before the commencement of a debt collection, if the
debtor, as the owner of a banking account, has no fixed place of resi-
dence in Switzerland or is likely to evade his legal obligations. 49 Finally,
the banking secrecy is superseded in a bankruptcy proceeding of the
bank itself. "The interest of a few persons in the secrecy has to give way
to the interest of the creditors to divulge the bank's business
38 Bundesgesetz uber die Bundesstrafrechtspflege of June 15, 1934.
39 See Mueller, supra note 8, at 366-68.
40 Id. at 368.
41 Bundesgesetz uber den Bundeszivilprozess of December 4, 1947.
42 The Cantons: Aargau, Berne, Geneva, Neuchatel, St. Gallen, Valais, Vaud. Meyer,
supra note 21, at 32.
43 The Cantons: Freiburg, Nidwalden, Schwyz, Ticino, Uri, Zug, Zurich. Id.
44 The Cantons: Appenzell AR, Appenzell IR, Basel-Land, Basel-Stadt, Glarus, Grison,
Lucerne, Obwalden, Shaffouse, Solothurn, Thurgau. Id. at 31.
45 The regulation in the Canton Jura is not known to the author.
46 Bundesgesetz uber Schuldbetreibung und Konkurs of April 11, 1889.
47 See Meyer, supra note 21, at 35.
48 Id. at 35 n.108.




Both the Federal state and the Cantons levy taxes. While fiscal
charges are imposed chiefly by Federal taxes, the levy of income and
capital taxes remains mainly in the province of the Cantons. 5 1 There-
fore, the latter taxes can differ substantially. The taxes are collected by
the Cantons in accordance with their own procedural law.
None of the Cantonal tax laws stipulates a general duty of third
persons to furnish tax authorities with information, nor do they impose
such duty especially on bankers. Thus a banker can refuse to provide
information to tax authorities. 52 This is only true for minor tax offenses,
however, usually called tax evasion by the tax laws.53 Tax evasion is the
non-reporting or the incomplete reporting of income or capital without
any further manipulations. 54
If the taxpayer uses fraudulent practices or falsifies documents in
order to mislead the Revenue authorities the situation changes. His tax
offense becomes a tax fraud according to the language of the tax laws. 55
Some Cantons treat tax fraud as a matter of tax law and impose no duty
of information on a third person. Others consider it a crime. The major
banking centers of Switzerland (t'e. Zurich, Geneva, and Basel), join the
latter group. Since these Cantons make tax fraud a crime, their respec-
tive codes of criminal procedure apply. As a result, the banking secrecy
is annulled when tax fraud is at issue.56
Under the Agreement between the Swiss Bankers' Association and
the Swiss National Bank on the Observance of Care by the Banks in
Accepting Funds, and on the Practice of Banking Secrecy, 57 the banks
bind themselves not to open any account or deposit without prior clarifi-
cation of the customer's identity,58 and not to support flight of capital
and tax evasion. 59 The duty to clarify thoroughly the customer's identity
requires that the latter identify himself if the banker does not know him
personally. 60 The identification must also be thoroughly examined
where the client is granted a numbered account.6 1 If the customer is
50 BG 86 III 114, 117. For a discussion of this decision see Mueller, supra note 8, at 369.
51 See WORLD TAX SERIES, TAXATION IN SWITZERLAND 133-137 (B. Boczek ed. 1976).
52 See Meyer, supra note 21, at 33.
53 Id at 33-34.
54 Id at 33.
55 Id at 34.
56 Id
57 The agreement, hereinafter cited as "Know your Customer Agreement," was first en-
acted on July 1, 1977 and was renewed for an additional five years on October 1, 1982 with
little change. It is accompanied by executive regulations of July 1, 1982, of the Swiss National
Bank and the Swiss Bankers' Association. See Hawes, Lee & Robert, Insider Trading Law Develop-
ment: An International Analysir, 14 LAW & POL'Y Bus. 335 (1982); Schultz, Bankgeheimnis und
internationale Rechtshilfe in Strafsachen, Bankvereinheft 22, 9-10 (1982).
58 Know your Customer Agreement, supra note 57, at Arts. 3-6.
59 Id at Arts. 8-9.
60 Id at Art. 3 and executive regulations.
61 id
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represented by an agent, the latter must identify his principal unless the
agent is a Swiss lawyer, notary, or member of a Swiss trust or auditing
company.62 This exception had to be made because of the professional
discretion of the referring agents. Even these agents, however, bound to
professional discretion by criminal sanctions, 63 must confirm to the bank
that they are not aware of any circumstances where the banking secrecy
will be abused. 64
In its second version, the agreement no longer mentions money obvi-
ously gained by criminal acts. The reason is that such behavior is inter-
dicted rigorously by the Swiss Criminal Code.65 Under the agreement, a
bank is not obliged to inform the authorities of a suspicious customer,
but it has to abandon business relationships with the regarding client
immediately. 66 A bank's infringement of the terms of the agreement is
punished by a penalty of up to ten million Swiss Francs.
67
This agreement appears to be applicable without any infringement
of banking secrecy laws.68 In accordance with the legal duties of confi-
dentiality, the agreement seems only to guarantee the ethics of the bank-
ers' profession. 69 To the extent that the agreement does limit the scope
of banking secrecy by empowering the banks to partially or wholly di-
vulge the secrecy, it would be irrelevant. 70 The banks cannot neutralize
the legal rights of their customers71 by a contract with a third party, here
the other banks and the Swiss National Bank. The agreement, therefore,
has no influence on the contents and scope of the Swiss banking secrecy.
IV. Disclosure of the Secrecy to Foreign Authorities
Swiss bankers are permitted to divulge the secrecy to Swiss, but not
to foreign authorities. 72 Foreign authorities have to request judicial
assistance by their diplomatic missions unless there, is a special agree-
ment. 73 The request must be addressed to the Federal Department of
Justice and Police. If permissible, the request is then forwarded to the
competent Cantonal court which rules on the request.
74
Because annulment of the banking secrecy is a "compulsory meas-
62 Id at Art. 6 and executive regulations.
63 See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
64 Know your Customer Agreement, supra note 57, at Art. 6 and executive regulations.
65 Under article 144 of the Swiss Criminal Code (Schweizerisches Strafgesetzbuch
[STGBI) the receiver of stolen goods generally "shall be confined in the penitentiary for not over
five years or in the prison."
66 Know your Customer Agreement, supra note 57, at Art. 11 and executive regulations.
67 Id at Art. 13 (3).
68 M. AUBERT, J. KERNEN, H. SCHONLE, LE SECRET BANCAIRE SUISSE 193 (1982).
69 Id.
70 Id at 188.
71 See supra notes 3-9 and accompanying text.
72 See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
73 See Miller, International Cooperation in Litigation Between the United States and Switzerland-




ure," it can be ordered by a Cantonal court only if such measures are
provided for by Swiss law or by a ratified treaty. 75 Switzerland enacted
the Federal Law on International Judicial Assistance in Criminal Mat-
ters on January 1, 1983, 76 which provides compulsory measures. 77 Such
measures are also provided for by the American-Swiss Treaty on Mutual
Assistance in Criminal Matters,78 and the European Convention on Ju-
dicial Assistance in Criminal Matters, the latter being enacted in Swit-
zerland on March 20, 1967. Since the Federal Law on International
Judicial Assistance in Criminal Matters applies to all states which have
no special treaty with Switzerland, it is possible for all foreign authorities
to ask for divulgence of the Swiss banking secrecy in the area of criminal
matters. 
79
There are, however, some important limitations. Traditionally,
Switzerland has refused judicial assistance which may jeopardize its sov-
ereignty, security, public order, or other of its essential interests. 80 Under
exceptional circumstances, the disclosure of a professional secret may
represent such an essential interest. In addition, assistance is refused if
foreign military, political or fiscal offenses are prosecuted. 8 ' The notion
of "fiscal offense" is interpreted extensively, and covers not only evasion
of public levy, but also violations of foreign exchange, trade, or economic
public regulations. 82 Such laws are often politically motivated.
V. Recent Insider Trading in America through Swiss Banks
American insiders, in possession of nonpublic information, may
channel their stock market operations through Swiss banks. In so doing,
they probably violate either Section 10(b) or Section 14(e) of the Securi-
ties Exchange Act of 1934,83 and Rule lOb-5 or 14e-3 84 promulgated
thereunder.85 By adding a third party between themselves and their bro-
ker they can realize illegal profits without material risk of detection by
75 AUBERT, KERNEN, SCHONLE, supra note 68, at 306.
76 Bundesgesetz iiber internationale Rechtshilfe in Strafsachen of March 20, 1981; enacted
January 1, 1983. For a discussion of-the impact of the new law, especially in tax matters, see
Friedli, New Law Helps Lo? Veil of Secrecyfrom Swiss Banking, Legal Times, Dec. 5, 1983, at 11.
77 Bundesgesetz uber internationale Rechtshilfe in Strafsachen at Art. 64.
78 27 U.S.T. 2019, T.I.A.S. No. 8302. For a discussion of this Treaty see ifra Section VI.
79 Other fields are usually of less importance. Nonetheless it is pointed out that Switzer-
land is a member of the Hague Convention on Judicial Assistance in Civil Procedure. Conven-
tion Relating to Civil Procedure, done Mar. 1, 1954, 286 U.N.T.S. 4173. Despite the fact that
the United States is not a party to this Convention, Switzerland grants United States requests
according to that Convention. See Frei, The Service of Process and the Taking of Evidence on Behalf of
US Proceedings -the Problem of Granting Assistance, 35 WUR 196, 200 (1983).
80 See Meyer, supra note 21, at 54.
81 Id at 55.
82 Id.
83 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) and § 78n(e) (Supp. 1980).
84 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 and 14e-3 (1981).
85 See Greene, US., Switzerland Agree to Prosecute Inside Traders, Legal Times, Oct. 4, 1982,
12, Col. 1, at 12, col. 2.
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the Securities and Exchange Commission,8 6 which is authorized by Sec-
tion 21 of the Securities Exchange Act to make regarding investiga-
tions.8 7 American authorities have studied this problem for many
years.8 8 Recently, however, two spectacular cases have renewed official
interest in the problem and have attracted the public's attention.
In SEC v. Unknown Purchasers of the Santa Fe Co. ,89 the Securities and
Exchange Commission filed a complaint against certain unknown pur-
chasers of the common stock of, and call options for, the common stock of
the Santa Fe International Corporation. The complaint alleged that the
unknown purchasers had violated the antifraud provisions of the Ex-
change Act by effecting transactions while in possession of material non-
public information, zie. merger discussions between Santa Fe and Kuwait
Petroleum Corp. The SEC's complaint further alleged that the un-
known purchasers sold the shares and option contracts in the two week
period following the announcement of the merger and that the value of
such shares and option contracts increased in the aggregate, over five
million dollars.9° The complaint named as "nominal" defendants vari-
ous financial institutions and broker-dealers with knowledge of the iden-
tity of the unknown purchasers and with custody of the proceeds of the
allegedly violative transactions. Such nominal defendants included two
of the most respected Swiss banks: Credit Suisse and Swiss Bank Corpo-
ration.9 ' The United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York granted the Commission's application for a temporary re-
straining order against the nominal defendants to prevent disposal of the
assets of the unknown purchasers relating to their transactions in Santa
Fe options and common stock.9 2 The SEC's application for an order
compelling the nominal defendants to identify the purchasers and for
expedited discovery was denied, however.9 3
In SEC v. Banca Della Svizzera Itah'ana (BSI) , 4 the District Court for
the Southern District of New York granted a farther reaching order than
was granted in Santa Fe. In this case, the SEC alleged insider trading on
the part of the defendant and its principals in the purchase and sale of
86 See in/fa Section VII.
87 15 U.S.C. § 78u (Supp. 1980).
88 See Swiss Banks and Secrecy Laws Hearings Before the House Comm. on Banking and Currency on
HR. 15037, 91st Cong., 1st and 2d Sess. 364 (1969-1970), at 12.
89 SEC v. Certain Unknown Purchasers of the Common Stock, and Call Options for the
Common Stock of Santa Fe Int'l Corp., [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH)
98,323 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 26, 1981).
90 Id. at 92,026.
91 Other nominal defendants were: Swiss-American Securities, Inc., Citibank, N.A., Lom-
bard Odier & Cie, Morgan Guaranty Trust Co. of New York, Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc.,
the Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., and Moseley, Hallgarten, Estabrook and Wedden, Inc. Id
at 92,025.
92 Id. at 92,026.
93 The SEC also subsequently brought charges against the general counsel of a subsidiary
of Santa Fe International Corp., his wife, other relatives, and a neighbor. See SEC v. Feole, 14
SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) No. 39, at 1717 (C.D. Cal. filed Sept. 8, 1982).
94 92 F.R.D. 111 (1981).
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call options for the common stock, as well as the common stock itself, of
St. Joe Minerals Corporation. 95 On March 10, 1981 the defendant
purchased through a New York subsidiary corporation 3,000 shares of St.
Joe common stock and approximately 1,055 call options which carried
the right to purchase 105,500 shares of common stock. The purchases in
question were made immediately prior to the announcement on March
11, 1981 of a cash tender offer by a subsidiary of Joseph E. Seagram &
Sons, Inc., an Indiana corporation. On the next day, BSI instructed its
brokers to close out the purchases of the options and sell 2,000 of the
3,000 shares of common stock. The transactions resulted in an overnight
profit of two million dollars.9 6
The Securities and Exchange Commission brought suit alleging that
the purchasers were unlawfully using material nonpublic information
which could only have been obtained or misappropriated from sources
charged with a confidential duty not to disclose information prior to the
public announcement of the tender offer. The SEC obtained a tempo-
rary restraining order against Irving Trust Company which held the pro-
ceeds of the sales of the options, and of the common stock, in defendant's
bank account with Irving Trust. The order also directed immediate dis-
covery proceedings, including the requirement that "insofar as permitted
by law" BSI should disclose within three business days the identity of its
principals. BSI refused to furnish the requested information, adhering to
its duties under Swiss banking secrecy law. 97
The court stated, that in line with other circuits and district courts,
the Second Circuit had retreated from the position that the foreign law's
prohibition of discovery is an absolute bar to compelling disclosure. 98 In
support of its position, the court referred to the Supreme Court's last
decision on the subject 99 and section 40 of the Restatement (Second),
Foreign Relations Law of the United States (1965) (Restatement of For-
eign Relations). In Soctete Intemationale pour Partici'patons Industrielles et
Commerciales, SA. v. Rogers, t ° ° the Supreme Court held that a foreign
law's prohibition of discovery is not decisive of the issue. The good faith
of the party resisting discovery is a key factor in the decision whether to
impose sanctions when a foreign law prohibits the requested disclosure.
Section 40 of the Restatement of Foreign Relations provides that where
95 The present case is sometimes also referred to as the St. Joe (Minerals) case.
96 92 F.R.D. at 113.
97 The defendant had furnished some, but not all, of the answers to the demanded inter-
rogatories after a waiver of Swiss banking confidentiality was secured from the customers con-
cerned. The released information disclosed the names of three Panamanian corporations and
one Swiss corporation for whom the St. Joe options had been purchased, as well as the name of
the customer who had ordered the transactions on the corporations' behalf: Giuseppe Tomo, a
close friend and advisor of the head of the Seagram Company. Siegel, United States Insider Trad-
ing Prohibition in Conflict with Swiss Bank Secrecy, 4 J. COMP. CORP. L. & SEC. REG. 353, 362
(1982).
98 92 F.R.D. at 116.
99 See infta note 100 and accompanying text.
1- 357 U.S. 197 (1958).
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two states have jurisdiction to prescribe and enforce rules of law, and the
rules they may prescribe require inconsistent conduct upon the part of a
person, each state is required to consider primarily the vital national in-
terests of each of the states and the hardship that inconsistent enforce-
ment actions would impose upon the person. 10 1
In BSI, the court emphasized the strength of the United States' in-
terest in enforcing its securities laws to ensure the integrity of its financial
markets. The court pointed out that secret foreign bank accounts and
secret foreign financial institutions had permitted a proliferation of
"white collar" crime and had allowed Americans and others to avoid the
laws and regulations concerning securities and exchanges. It went on to
emphasize the debilitating effects of the use of these secret institutions on
Americans and on the American economy.' 0 2 The court also observed
that, although expressly aware of the litigation, the Swiss government
had expressed no opposition, and neither the United States nor the Swiss
government had suggested that discovery be halted. The court stated
that Swiss banking secrecy law had been enacted primarily to protect the
right of privacy of clients, 10 3 not to protect the Swiss government itself or
some other public interest.
The court examined the hardship factor of section 40 of the Restate-
ment of Foreign Relations together with the good faith requirement
stated by the Supreme Court in Societe.l0 4 Regarding the hardship that
inconsistent enforcement actions would impose upon the party subject to
both jurisdictions, it was admitted that BSI might be subject to fines and
its officers to imprisonment under Swiss law. 10 5 The court empha-
sized, 10 6 however, that article 34 of the Swiss Penal Code'017 contains a
"State of Necessity" exception that relieves a person of criminal liability
for acts committed to protect one's own good, including one's fortune,
from an immediate danger, if one is not responsible for the danger and
101 Section 40 of the Restatement of Foreign Relations reads as follows:
Limitations on Exercise of Enforcement Jurisdiction:
Where two states have jurisdiction to prescribe and enforce rules of law and the
rules they may prescribe require inconsistent conduct upon the part of a person,
each state is required by international law to consider, in good faith, moderating
the exercise of its enforcement jurisdiction, in the light of such factors as
(a) vital national interests of each of the states,
(b) the extent and the nature of the hardship that inconsistent enforcement ac-
tions would impose upon the person,
(c) the extent to which the required conduct is to take place in the territory of the
other state,
(d) the nationality of the person, and
(e) the extent to which enforcement by action of either state can reasonably be
expected to achieve compliance with the rule prescribed by that state.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 40 (1965).
102 92 F.R.D. at 117.
103 See Comment, supra note 6.
104 92 F.R.D. at 114-15.
105 See Banking Law, supra note 24.
106 92 F.R.D. at 118.
107 C.P. Art. 34.
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one cannot be expected to give up one's good. 108
The court stated that should the Swiss government conclude that
BSI is responsible for the conflict it is in, and therefore not apply the
State of Necessity exception, this would be a result of BSI's bad faith.109
The bad faith consisted in the deliberate use of Swiss nondisclosure law
to evade, in a commercial transaction for profit, the strictures of Ameri-
can securities law against insider trading. The court went on to say that
whether acting solely as agent, or also as principal, (something which
could only be clarified through disclosure of the requested information),
BSI invaded American securities markets and profited in some measure
thereby.110 The defendant could not rely, therefore, on Swiss nondisclo-
sure law to shield such activity. 1 1
The court summarized its position as follows: "It would be a trav-
esty of justice to permit a foreign company to invade American markets,
violate American laws if they were indeed violated, withdraw profits and
resist accountability for itself and its principals for the illegality by claim-
ing their anonymity under foreign law." 11 2
VI. The Treaty between the United States and Switzerland on
Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters of May 25, 1973
(Treaty) 13
A. Introduction
The negotiations between the United States and Switzerland lasted
more than four years before the Treaty was finally signed by the parties
on May 25, 1973 in Bern, Switzerland. The Treaty was enacted after
another four years on January 23, 1977.114 The long discussions between
the parties were primarily due to two circumstances. First, it was the
first time that a judicial assistance treaty in criminal matters was settled
by two countries with completely different systems of law, i.e. Anglo-
Saxon common law as opposed to continental European civil law.11 5
108 Article 34 of the Swiss Penal Code reads as follows:
Present Danger:
1. An act committed by a person to save his life, person, freedom, honor, or
property from an immediate danger which cannot be averted otherwise, shall not
be punishable if the danger was not caused by the offender and further if he could
not be expected under the circumstances to make this sacrifice. If the danger was
caused by the offender or if he could be expected to make this sacrifice, the court,
in its discretion, may impose a less severe sentence (article 66 of this Code).
C.P. Art. 34. (Subparagraph 2. does not apply here. It deals with the case where a third person
is in a present danger.).
109 92 F.R.D. at 118.
'tOId. at 117.
111 d. The court also referred to the remaining factors of section 40 of the Restatement of
Foreign Relations, giving minor importance to them.
112 Id. at 119.
113 Treaty on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, May 25, 1973, United States-
Switzerland, 27 U.S.T. 2019, T.I.A.S. No. 8302 [hereinafter cited as Treaty].
114 Id.
115 See Wicki, Der "Staatsvertrag Zwischen der Schweizerischen Eidgenossenschaft und
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Second, the motives of the parties to enter into an assistance treaty in
criminal matters differed widely. Switzerland wanted a comprehensive
agreement covering all aspects of judicial assistance equivalent to the Eu-
ropean Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters. The
United States wanted to lift the Swiss banking secrecy, especially where
tax violations, securities law offenses and organized crime were prose-
cuted.11 6 The final formulation of the Treaty is a compromise of the
parties' differing interests.1 17
B. Principles of the Treaty
Under the Treaty, mutual assistance is granted in investigations or
court proceedings of offenses punishable within the jurisdiction of the
requesting state. 118 The Treaty does not apply, however, to investiga-
tions or proceedings concerning political or military offenses and pro-
ceedings for the purpose of enforcing cartel or antitrust law. 119
Investigations or proceedings concerning violations of tax laws, customs
duties, governmental monopoly charges or exchange control regulations
also are exempt.120 Moreover, assistance may be refused where the sov-
ereignty, security or similar essential interests of the requested state are at
stake. 121
Under the "Principle of Specialty," information which is obtained
pursuant to the Treaty generally must not be used by the requesting
state in any other investigation or proceeding. 122 Thus, information may
not be requested and obtained under criminal charges and then used in a
fiscal prosecution.
In the execution of a request, the state receiving the request may use
only such compulsory measures as are provided for within its domestic
jurisdiction. Compulsory measures will be applied only if the act de-
scribed in the request contains the elements, other than intent or negli-
gence, of an offense which would be punishable under the law of the
state receiving the request. This is the so-called "Requirement of Mutual
Penal Liability."' 123 The Treaty comprises an appendix of offenses for
which compulsory measures are available (Schedule). 12 4 The Treaty,
moreover, states that "in the case of such an offense not listed in the
den Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika uber gegenseitige Rechtshilfe in Strafsachen" aus der
Sicht eines Bankjuristen, 70 SJZ 341, 342 (1974).
116 See Meyer, supra note 21, at 64.
''7 Id.
118 Treaty, supra note 113, at Art. 1(1)(a).
119 Id. at Art. 2(I)(c).
120 Unless they equal an offense against the laws relating to bookmaking, lotteries and gam-
bling when conducted as a business. Id. at Art. 2(1)(c)(5).
121 Id. at Art. 3(1)(a).
122 Id. at Art. 5(1).
123 Id. at Art. 4(2).




Schedule, the Central Authority of the requested State (here the Swiss




4. Malicious wounding; inflicting grievous bodily harm intentionally or through gross
negligence.
5. Threat to commit murder; threat to inflict grievous bodily harm.
6. Unlawful throwing or application of any corrosive or injurious substances upon the
person of another.
7. Kidnapping; false imprisonment or other unlawful deprivation of the freedom of an
individual.
8. Willful nonsupport or willful abandonment of a minor or other dependent person
when the life of that minor or other dependent person is or is likely to be injured or
endangered.
9. Rape, indecent assault.
10. Unlawful sexual acts with or upon children under the age of sixteen years.
11. Illega! abortion.
12. Traffic in women and children.
13. Bigamy.
14. Robbery.
15. Larceny; burglary; house-breaking or shop-breaking.
16. Embezzlement; misapplication or misuse of funds.
17. Extortion, blackmail.
18. Receiving or transporting money, securities or other property, knowing the same to
have been embezzled, stolen or fraudently obtained.
19. Fraud, including:
a. obtaining property, services, money or securities by false pretenses or by de-
frauding by means of deceit, falsehood or any fraudulent means;
b. fraud against the requesting State, its states or cantons or municipalities thereof;
c. fraud or breach of trust committed by any person;
d. use of the mails or other means of communication with intent to defraud or
deceive, as punishable under the laws of the requesting State.
20. Fraudulent bankruptcy.
21. False business declarations regarding companies and cooperative associations, induc-
ing speculation, unfaithful management, suppression of documents.
22. Bribery, including soliciting, offering and accepting.
23. Forgery and counterfeiting, including:
a. the counterfeiting or forgery of public or private securities, obligations, instruc-
tions to make payment, invoices, instruments of credit or other instruments;
b. the counterfeiting or alteration of coin or money;
c. the counterfeiting or forgery of public seals, stamps or marks;
d. the fraudulent use of the foregoing counterfeited or forged articles;
e. knowingly and without lawful authority, making or having in possession any
instrument, instrumentality, tool or machine adapted or intended for the counter-
feiting of money whether coin or paper.
24. Knowingly and willfully making, directly or through another, a false, fictitious or
fraudulent statement or representation in a matter within the jurisdiction of any de-
partment or agency in the requesting State, and relating to an offense mentioned in
this Schedule or otherwise falling under this Treaty.
25. Perjury, subornation of perjury and other false statements under oath.
26. Offenses against the laws relating to bookmaking, lotteries and gambling when con-
ducted as a business.
27. Arson.
28. Willful and unlawful destruction or obstruction of a railroad, aircraft, vessel or other
means of transportation or any malicious act done with intent to endanger the safety
of any person travelling upon a railroad, or in any aircraft, vessel or other means of
transportation.
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justifies the use of compulsory measures."' 25 This provision does not
mean that under special circumstances the banking secrecy may be su-
perseded even if the pursued act is not a crime in Switzerland. It is only
a general provision concerning new crimes which are punishable in both
countries, but which are not listed in the Schedule. 126 This Schedule is
generally authoritative. 27
Chapter Two of the Treaty deals with the prosecution of organized
crime. 12 8 Here, Switzerland has abandoned its fundamental principles
of judicial assistance and will grant assistance in investigations and pro-
ceedings concerning political offenses and violations of cartel law, tax
law, customs duties, governmental monopoly charges or exchange con-
29. Piracy; mutiny or revolt on board an aircraft or vessel against the authority of the
captain or commander of such aircraft or vessel; any seizure or exercise of control, by
force or violence or threat of force or violence, of an aircraft or vessel.
30. Offenses against laws (whether in the form of tax laws or other laws) prohibiting,
restricting or controlling the traffic in, importation or exportation, possession, con-
cealment, manufacture, production or use of:
a. narcotic drugs, cannabis sativa-L, psychotropic drugs, cocaine and its derivatives;
b. poisonous chemicals and substances injurious to health;
c. firearms, other weapons, explosive and incendiary devices;
when violation of such laws causes the violator to be liable to criminal prosecution
and imprisonment.
31. Unlawful obstruction of court proceedings or proceedings before governmental bodies
or interference with an investigation of a violation of a criminal statute by the influ-
encing, bribing, impeding, threatening, or injuring of any officer of the court, juror,
witness, or duly authorized criminal investigator.
32. Unlawful abuse of official authority which results in deprivation of the life, liberty or
property of any person.
33. Unlawful injury, intimidation or interference with voting or candidacy for public of-
fice, jury service, government employment, or the receipt or enjoyment of benefits
provided by government agencies.
34. Attempts to commit, conspiracy to commit, or participation in, any of the offenses
enumerated in the preceding paragraphs of this Schedule; accessory after the fact to
the commission of any of the offenses enumerated in this Schedule.
35. Any offense of which one of the above listed offenses is a substantial element, even if,
for purposes ofjurisdiction of the United States Government, elements such as trans-
porting, transportation, the use of the mails or interstate facilities are also included.
125 Id. at 4(3).
126 See Wicki, supra note 115, at 343.
127 Treaty, supra note 113, at Art. 4(2)(a).
128 Article 6(3) defines the term "organized criminal group" as an association or group of
persons combined together for a substantial or indefinite period for the purposes of obtaining
monetary or commercial gains or profits for itself or for others, wholly or in part by illegal
means, and for protecting its illegal activities against criminal prosecution and which, in carry-
ing out its purposes, in a methodical and systematic manner;
(a) at least in part of its activities, commits or threatens to commit acts of vio-
lence or other acts which are likely to intimidate and are punishable in both
States; and
(b) either: (1) strives to obtain influence in politics or commerce, especially in
political bodies or organizations, public administrations, the judiciary, in com-
mercial enterprises, employers' associations or trade unions or other employees'
associations; or (2) associates itself formally or informally with one or more similar
associations or groups, at least one of which engages in the activities described
under subparagraph (b) (1).
Id. at Art. 6(3).
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trol regulations 129 involving organized crime. The reason for this excep-
tion wasthat the heads of organized criminal groups can usually only be
convicted of the above-mentioned crimes. Switzerland also agreed to
forego the Principle of Speciality and the Requirement of Mutual Penal
Liability where organized crime is prosecuted.l3 0
C Banking Secrecy Information under the Treaty
Requests for disclosure of banking secrecy information have to be
transmitted by the American Attorney General (or his designee) to the
Swiss Division of Police in Bern. 31I According to the Swiss Execution
Law,' 32 the Federal Department of Justice and Police first examines
whether the Swiss sovereignty or similar essential interests would be en-
dangered by disclosure of the requested information. 133 Similar essential
interests could be at stake, for example, if a bank were to disclose its
relationship with a large number of its customers not involved in the
crime, or if large transactions important to the whole Swiss economy
would have to be revealed. 134 Refusal, however, must be a rare excep-
tion. Switzerland has appointed a special commission composed of five
to seven members to decide such questions. 135
The Swiss Division of Police then examines whether the request is in
accordance with the Treaty, 36 whether organized crime is prosecuted,137
and whether the prosecuted act satisfies the "Requirement of Mutual
Penal Liability."' 13 Since the annulment of the banking secrecy is a
compulsory measure, it cannot be ordered without this requirement. 139
If the request is in accordance with the Treaty, and especially if compul-
sory measures can be applied, the Federal Division of Police forwards the
request to the competent Cantonal executive authority (Cantonal de-
partment of justice or district attorney) which then lifts the banking
secrecy.
VII. Limited Judicial Assistance under the Treaty
In Santa Fe and BSI, the Securities and Exchange Commission's in-
vestigations regarding likely insider transactions were impaired by Swiss
129 Id. at Art. 2(2).
130 Id. at Arts. 5(2)(c) and 7(1).
'3' Id. at Art. 28(1).
132 Bundesgesetz zum Staatsvertrag mit den Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika uber gegen-
seitige Rechtshilfe in Strafsachen of Oct. 3, 1975 [hereinafter cited as Execution Law.).
133 Id. at Art. 4.
134 Message from the President of the United States transmitting the Treaty between the
United States of America and the Swiss Confederation on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Mat-
ters to the Senate, 12 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 234 (Feb. 18, 1976).
135 Execution Law, supra note 132, at Art. 6.
136 See Treaty, supra note 113, at Art. 32(1) & (2); Swiss Execution Law, supra note 132, at
Art. 5(2)(a).
137 See Treaty, supra note 113, at Art. 8(2).
138 Id
139 d at Art. 4(2)(a).
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banking secrecy laws. Since the United States has a Treaty on Mutual
Assistance in Criminal Matters with Switzerland, 40 the question arises
whether the necessary information could be obtained through the chan-
nels of the Treaty in such cases. In both cases the SEC filed complaints
in U.S. courts against Swiss banks without first calling for assistance
under the Treaty. In Santa Fe, the Securities and Exchange Commission
applied to the Swiss Division of Police for assistance in accordance with
the Treaty in March 19 8 2 ,141 only after the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of New York refused to issue an order compelling the
banks to identify their customers.14 2
There are two problems in applying the Treaty to situations as
presented in Santa Fe and BSI. First, the purpose of the Treaty is to
obtain evidence for criminal proceedings. The proceedings of the SEC,
however, are of an administrative nature under Swiss law since the SEC
is an administrative authority. 143 Few securities violations are prose-
cuted criminally in the United States. Most actions are brought before
civil courts by the SEC.144 If a bank refuses to comply, the SEC brings a
motion under Rule 37 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for an
order compelling discovery and imposing sanctions upon the bank if it
fails to identify the customer(s). 145 It is questionable, therefore, whether
the Treaty can be invoked at all. Second, even if the Treaty is applicable,
the Swiss banking secrecy can be superseded only if the prosecuted act is
a crime in Switzerland as well.' 46 But insider trading, ie. securities
transactions executed while in possession of material nonpublic informa-
tion, is not prohibited explicitly under Swiss law. 14 7
In its landmark decision of January 26, 1983148 the Swiss Federal
Supreme Court decided these issues in the case of X. v. Federal Oftefor
Police Matters.149 The case has the following history: As previously men-
tioned' 50 in the Santa Fe case, in March 1982, the SEC asked the Swiss
Division of Police for judicial assistance, which was granted. 15 A com-
plaint against this decision was handed down in June 1982 by the same
authority. 152 The unknown appellant appealed directly to the Swiss
Federal Supreme Court asking for a reversal of the decision of the Fed-
140 See supra note 113.
141 BG 109 lb 48, see infia notes 148-181.
142 See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
143 See Frei, supra note 79, at 207.
144 See Greene, supra note 85, at 14, col. 1.
145 Id at 14, col. 3.
146 See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
147 See, e.g., Briner, Insider Trading in Switzerland, 10 INT'L BUs. LAw. 348, 348 (1982).
148 The decision was not officially published before the end of 1983.
149 BG 109 Ib 47. The Swiss Division of Police is also called Federal Office for Police
Matters.
150 See supra note 141 and accompanying text.




eral Office for Police Matters. 153
The Swiss Supreme Court held that SEC investigations are criminal
under the Treaty. Citing the Message from the President of the United
States transmitting the Treaty to the Senate,15 4 the court held that the
SEC investigations are criminal proceedings as long as they might end
up in a criminal court. 155 The court observed that insider trading may
be prosecuted criminally in the United States, referring to Section 32 of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.156 The channels of the Treaty are
thus open to SEC investigations. 157
The success of lifting the banking secrecy in SEC investigations fur-
ther depends on whether insider trading is a crime under Swiss law.158
In . v. Federal Ofefor Poh'ce Matters the Swiss Supreme Court held that
there is no proviso under Swiss law that explicitly prohibits insider trad-
ing. 1 59 The court then scrutinized whether insider trading is a violation
of articles 159 (unfaithful management), 148 (fraud) or 162 (violation of
business secrets) of the Swiss Penal Code. 160
The court first held that insider trading cannot be punished as un-
faithful management under article 159 of the Penal Code. 6 1 The un-
faithful management provision 62 requires that the offender injure
property for which he has a legal or contractual duty of care. The Swiss
Supreme Court also held that an officer of a corporation owes such a
duty to the property of the corporation. 163 The corporation's property is
not infringed, however, by an insider transaction of its manager. 164 In
the present case, neither Santa Fe Int'l Corp. nor Kuwait Petroleum
Corp. had sustained a loss. 165
The court in X. v. Federal Ofcefor Police Matters also stated that in-
sider trading cannot be punished as fraud according to article 148 of the
Swiss Penal Code.' 66 The fraud proviso 167 requires that the delinquent
153 Id
154 See supra note 134, at 36.
135 BG 109 Ib 51.
156 15 U.S.C. § 78a-78kk (1982).
157 BG 109 Ib 51.
158 See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
159 BG 109 Ib 53.
160 Id at 53-58.
161 Id at 53.
162 Article 159 of the Swiss Penal Code stipulates:
Unfaithful Management:
Whoever dissipates the resources of another person entrusted to him by law or
contract shall be confined in the prison. If the offender acted from selfish motives,
he shall be confined in the prison for not over five years and fined. Unfaithful
management to the disadvantage of a relative or a member of the (same) family
shall be prosecuted on petition only.
C.P. Art. 159.
163 BG 109 Ib 53.
164 Id
165 Id at 54.
166 Id at 56.
167 Article 148 of the Swiss Penal Code provides:
1983]
N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
fraudulently mislead another or fraudulently use the error of another.
The court stated that only the second alternative, ise. use of an error,
could be fulfilled by inside traders since there is no personal communica-
tion between buyer and seller on the stock exchange. 168 The court then
rejected a fraudulent use of an error by the insider for four reasons: (a)
the insider, not being personally at the stock exchange, does not support
the outsider in his error, which would be indispensable; 169 (b) in the ab-
sence of personal contacts, the insider cannot protect the outsider, thus
he has no disclosure duties;170 (c) the absence of personal contacts be-
tween buyer and seller at the stock exchange precludes deceit on the part
of the insider, and there is no fraud without deceit; 17' and (d) the out-
sider would have traded on the stock exchange without the transactions
of the insider, so that there is no cause in fact between the damage and
the insider transaction. 172
The Federal Supreme Court of Switzerland finally examined
whether insider trading is a violation of business secrets, punished by
article 162 of the Penal Code. The mentioned provision 73 punishes not
only those who, despite a legal or contractual duty of discretion, give a
business secret away, but also those who profit by the information. The
court held that the passing-on of inside information, i.e. tipping by per-
sons with the above mentioned duty of discretion, is punishable under
article 162 of the Swiss Penal Code. 174 Article 162, however, cannot be
applied, the court continued, where the insider does not pass on his infor-
mation, but acts on it for himself.' 75
The Swiss Supreme Court concluded its decision in X. v. Federal Of
ficefor Police Matters as follows: Since the SEC's application for judicial
assistance did not present any evidence as to whether inside information
was passed on (which would be a violation of Swiss law), the Federal
Fraud:
Any person who, with intent to make an unlawful profit for himself or another,
shall fraudulently mislead another person by falsely representing or concealing
facts or shall fraudulently use the error of another and thus cause the deceived
person to act detrimentally against his own or another's property, shall be con-
fined in the penitentiary for not more than five years or in the prison.
The offender shall be punishable with a penitentiary term of not over ten years
and fined if he makes a business of committing frauds.
Defrauding a relative or a member of (one's) own family shall be prosecuted on
petition only.
C.P. Art. 148.
168 BG 109 Id 54, 55.
169 Id at 55.
170 Id
171 Id
172 Id. at 56.
173 Article 162 of the Swiss Penal Code reads:
Violation of Business Secrets:
Whoever, despite a legal or contractual duty of discretion, gives a business secret
away, whoever utilizes the betrayal, shall, on petition, be confined to jail or fined.
C.P. Art. 162.
174 BG 109 Ib 57.175 Id
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Office for Police Matters was wrong to grant judicial assistance.1 76 In an
obiter dictum ," the court indicated that violation of a business secret might
not have a corresponding offense in the Schedule as required by article
4(2) of the Treaty. 177 The most similar counterpart of a violation or a
business secret in the Schedule is a breach of trust, 178 but the court in its
final remark showed its unwillingness to apply that offense to insider
cases. 1 79 Nevertheless, the Swiss Supreme Court stated earlier in the
same decision' 80 that the Federal Office for Police Matters is free to
grant assistance according to article 4(3) of the Treaty. This seems to be
correct since the "Requirement of Mutual Penal Liability" is met in tip-
ping cases.' 8 '
VIII. The "Memorandum of Understanding" between the United
States and Switzerland of August 31, 1982
(Memorandum)18 2
A. Background
The Treaty between the United States and Switzerland on Mutual
Assistance in Criminal Matters of May 25, 1973,183 provides limited help
to the Securities and Exchange Commission. The recent decision of the
Swiss Federal Supreme Court, X. v. Federal Office for Police Matters, shows
that assistance is confined to tipping cases which could be a violation of
business secrets under Swiss law.'
84
If the SEC files a civil complaint and seeks an order compelling the
bank to identify its client without calling on judicial assistance according
to the Treaty, the route the SEC chose to take in BSI, jurisdiction over
the bank is first required, 8 5 and American courts do not automatically
compel Swiss banks to divulge the secrecy, as was illustrated in Sante Fe.
According to the Supreme Court's opinion in Societe, such compulsion is
appropriate only where the bank acted in bad faith.'8 6 Moreover, an
order compelling discovery is granted only where the vital national inter-
ests of the United States prevail over those of Switzerland. 8 7 Therefore,
176 Id. at 57-58.
177 See supra notes 124-127 and accompanying text.
178 Treaty, supra note 113, at app. Sched. § 19c. For the text of § 19c, see supra note 124.
179 BG 109 Ib 58.
180 Id at 52-53.
181 See supra notes 123-127 and accompanying text.
182 The complete text of the Memorandum of Understanding is enclosed as Appendix A of
this issue [hereinafter cited as Memorandum].
183 Treaty, supra note 113.
184 See supra notes 148-181 and accompanying text.
185 In BSI, jurisdiction existed because the defendant had a subsidiary in New York. 92
F.R.D. 111, 112 (1981). Swiss banks could avoid U.S. jurisdiction by doing no more than in-
structing U.S. broker dealers to purchase securities on U.S. markets upon the order of foreign
customers. Another way to avoid U.S. jurisdiction would be to purchase the securities on the
stock exchanges of London or Zurich, Switzerland. See Siegel, supra note 97, at 364-65.
186 357 U.S. 197 (1958).
187 See supra notes 101 and accompanying text.
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neither requesting judicial assistance under the Treaty, nor seeking an
order compelling the bank to identify its customer in a U.S. court, are
efficient ways to provide the SEC with the necessary information.
In BSI the court ordered disclosure, with severe contempt sanctions
for noncompliance. 18  The sanctions, a fine of up to $50,000 per day and
the possible exclusion of BSI from the American securities markets,
alarmed the Swiss banking industry.1 9 Shortly before, the Swiss "Ban-
que Populaire" (Volksbank) had been barred by the Commodity Futures
Trading Commission from trading on United States contract markets for
ninety days, 19° and other Swiss banks were still under a temporary re-
straining order preventing the disposal of assets involved in the Santa Fe
case. 19 1 In addition, the Securities and Exchange Commission's attempts
to acquire more information on BSI than was originally decreed by the
court resulted in an official "demarche" of the Swiss Embassy at the
State Department in Washington, D.C. 192
These incidents caused great concern in Switzerland because the
American securities market is essential to Swiss banks in conducting in-
ternational business. In the United States, around forty percent of the
securities transactions carried out by foreign banks are put through by
Swiss banks.' 93 In addition, these events made it much more difficult for
Swiss banking lawyers to predict the outcome of future conflicts with the
SEC before U.S. courts.
At the invitation of Switzerland, the arising legal problems were first
discussed in Bern, Switzerland on March 1 and 2, 1982.1 94 The discus-
sions continued in Montreal, Canada in June 1982, t95 and terminated in
Washington, D.C. on August 30 and 31, 1982.196 After two days of nego-
tiations the parties came to an understanding regarding the future hand-
ling of insider trading on U.S. stock exchanges through Swiss banks. The
result was the "Memorandum of Understanding," signed on August 31,
1982.
188 See Greene, supra note 85, at 14, col. 1, n. 21.
189 See Jost, Insidrgeschaflte, TAGES ANZEIGER MAGAZIN, Nov. 20, 1982, at 6, 10.
190 In The Matter of Banque Populaire, § 21,255 NO. 80-8 25,299; 25,257 (1981).
191 See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
192 See Gesprache md SEC: Ketne Konkreten Ergebnise, DER BUND, Mar. 4, 1982, at 2.
193 See Jost, supra note 189, at 10.
194 The Swiss delegation was headed by Minister Jean Zwahlen, head of the Economic and
Financial Section of the Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, while the American delegation
was headed by the American Ambassadress in Switzerland, Faith Ryan Whittlesey. Consider-
ing the complexity of the legal problems, the parties agreed to adjourn their negotiations.
195 See Greene, supra note 85, at 15, col. 2.
196 In Washington, D.C., the Swiss delegation was headed again by Minister Jean Zwahlen
and included other representatives of the Federal government and representatives of the Federal
Banking Commission and the Swiss National Bank. The delegation of the United States in-
cluded John M. Fedders, Director of the Division of Enforcement of the SEC; Edward F.
Greene, General Counsel of the SEC; Roger M. Olsen, Deputy Assistant Attorney General,
Criminal Division, Department of Justice; John R. Crook, Assistant Legal Advisor for Eco-
nomic Business Affairs, Department of State; and other representatives of the Department of
State and Department of Justice. See Memorandum, supra note 182, at 1.1.
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B. Contents of the Memorandum of Understanding
Readers of the text of the Memorandum will be disappointed. It
does not contain any procedural rules for handling future cases of insider
trading by American and Swiss authorities. Instead, rules are contained
in a private Agreement of the Swiss Bankers' Association that was re-
ferred to in the Memorandum.
The Memorandum is divided into five parts: (1) Introduction; (2)
Exchange of Opinions Regarding the Treaty between the United States
and Switzerland on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters; (3) Discus-
sion of the Proposed Private Agreement Among Members of the
Swiss Bankers' Association; (4) Further Consultations; and (5) Other
Understandings.
The introduction states that both nations recognize that there is a
conflict of interest between the SEC's investigative role and the Swiss
banking secrecy law, and realize that the recent cases involving insider
trading are detrimental to the interests of both nations. 19 7 The introduc-
tion also mentions that a discussion of the Private Agreement Among
Members of the Swiss Bankers' Association is part of the two nations'
final understanding.
In part two of the Memorandum, the parties affirmed the impor-
tance of the Treaty and noted that it should be used to the extent feasi-
ble. 198 The parties observed that, pursuant to article 1, paragraph 1 of
the Treaty, assistance could be furnished as long as the investigation: (1)
relates to criminal conduct, and (2) the prosecuted offense is a crime
under the laws of each nation. 199 The parties also acknowledged that
insider trading could be a violation of articles 148 (fraud), 159 (unfaith-
ful management) or 162 (violation of business secrets) of the Swiss Penal
Code, and that compulsory measures, such as lifting the banking secrecy,
will often be possible. 2° ° In addition, they agreed to exchange diplo-
matic notes to facilitate ancillary administrative proceedings in cases of
offenses covered by the Treaty.
In part three of the Memorandum the parties noted that compul-
sory measures are not available under the Treaty if the available infor-
mation fails to indicate the existence of an offense under the Swiss Penal
Code. It appeared, however, that this gap could be filled by a proposed
Agreement of the Swiss Bankers' Association (Agreement), which would
permit participating banks to disclose the identity of a customer and cer-
tain other relevant information, under certain specified circumstances.
The parties observed that the said Agreement would be submitted for
signature to those banks located in Switzerland which might trade in the
197 Id. at I. 4.
198 Id. at 11. 1. & 2.
199 Id. at II. 3a & b.
200 Id. at II. 3b. Despite what the Memorandum says, compulsory measures will be limited
to tipping cases. See supra notes 148-181 and accompanying text.
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United States securities markets, and that the Agreement would also gov-
ern the relationship between signatory banks and clients. The parties
subsequently discussed specific points of the Swiss Banker's Association
Agreement. 2 0 1
Part four of the Memorandum provides for further contacts and
consultations in the future regarding the SEC's best efforts to inform
Swiss authorities about investigations and the Swiss Government's best
efforts to handle such information with appropriate care.20 2
In part five, the two nations stated that the Memorandum does not
modify or supersede any laws or regulations in either country. They
agreed that no rights are conferred to bank customers in the United
States court proceedings by the terms of the Agreement of the Swiss
Bankers' Association. At the close of the Memorandum, the parties as-
certained that the Swiss Bankers' Association will use its best efforts to
promptly obtain the signatures of the banks concerned.20 3
IX. Agreement of the Swiss Bankers' Association with Regard to
the Handling of Requests for Information from the SEC on
the Subject of Misuse of Inside Information
(Agreement)204
The key element of the "Memorandum of Understanding" was the
proposed Agreement between the Swiss Bankers' Association and its
members.2 0 5 After the Memorandum was adopted, the Swiss Bankers'
Association asked its members and all other banks trading in U.S. securi-
ties markets to join the Agreement, which became effective on January 1,
1983.206
The Agreement states the formal procedure for disclosing informa-
tion in connection with an investigation concerning possible violation of
U.S. insider trading laws. The U.S. Department of Justice, either on its
own behalf or on behalf of the SEC, must send a written application to
the Swiss Federal Office for Police Matters,20 7 which transmits the in-
quiry to a specially created Commission.2 0 8  Under certain conditions,
the Commission calls for an appropriate report from the bank(s) on the
201 See infra Section IX.
202 See Memorandum, supra note 182, at IV.
203 Id. at V.
204 The complete text of this Agreement - better known in Switzerland as Agreement
XVI or Convention XVI - is enclosed as Appendix B of this issue [hereinafter cited as
Agreement].
205 International Agreements: United States-Switzerland Investigation of Insider Trading Through
Swiss Banks, 23 HARV. INT'L L. J. 437, 439 (1982-1983).
206 All major banks joined the Agreement in order to profit from the special proceedings
guaranteed by the Memorandum and the Agreement, and to avoid being subject to the more
severe sanctions of United States courts.
207 Unfortunately the name of this Swiss authority was translated differently in the Treaty
on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters. There it was named Swiss Division of Police. See
supra note 131 and accompanying text.
208 See Agreement, supra note 204, at Art. 3(1).
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transactions concerned and furnishes the report to the Federal Office for
Police Matters, to be forwarded to the SEC. 20 9
The Agreement has a preamble and twelve articles. It can best be
subdivided into five parts: (1) the definition of what is considered insider
trading, and who is regarded as an insider (articles 1 and 5, subsection 2);
(2) the Commission and the preconditions of its inquiries (articles 2 and
3); (3) the procurement and transmission of information by the Commis-
sion (articles 4, 5, 7 and 8); (4) the blocking of the customer's account
(article 9); and (5) various other provisions (articles 6, 10, 11 and 12).
According to the Agreement, a bank shall disclose information only
where a customer has given the bank an order to be executed in the U.S.
securities markets within twenty-five days prior to a public announce-
ment of a business combination 2 10 or acquisition. 2 11 The banks cannot
disclose information concerning forms of insider trading that are not in-
cluded in the Agreement. Under the Agreement, insiders are:
(a) Members of the board, officers, auditors or mandated persons of
the company in question or assistants of any of them;
(b) Members of public authorities or public officers who, in the exe-
cution of their public duty, received information about an ac-
quisition or a business combination; or
(c) Persons who, on the basis of information about an acquisition or
business combination received from a person described in the
preceding two groups, have been able to act for the latter or to
benefit themselves from inside information. 21 2
A. The Commssion and its Powers and Duties
The Board of Directors of the Swiss Bankers' Association shall ap-
point a Commission of Inquiry composed of three members and three
deputies. 2 13 They may not be executives of either a bank or a company
subject to the Swiss Banking Law. 214 Furthermore, the members of the
Commission, their deputies, and staff are bound by the rule of banking
secrecy. 2 15
The Commission handles a request only if all of the following re-
quirements are met:
(a) The U.S. Department of Justice must submit a written applica-
tion to be transmitted to the Commission by the Swiss Federal
209 Id. at Arts. 4(1) and 5.
210 A proposed merger, consolidation, sale of substantially all of the issuer's assets or other
similar business combination. Id. at Art. 1.
211 The proposed acquisition of at least 10% of the securities of an issuer by open market
purchase, tender offer or otherwise. Id. at Art. 1.
212 Id. at Art. 5(2).
213 Id. at Art. 2(1).
214 Id.
215 Id. at Art. 2(2).
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Office for Police Matters;2 16
(b) The request must be accompanied by documentation that offers
evidence materially relevant to the inquiry;
217
(c) The request must specify the securities transaction in
question; 2 18
(d) The SEC must satisfactorily show that these transactions were
made in violation of American insider trading laws and that
material price and volume movements have occurred; 2 19 and
(e) The request must be accompanied by an assurance by the SEC
not to disclose the information to any person except in connec-
tion with its investigations.220
If the preceding conditions are met, the Commission must promptly
call upon the bank(s) concerned for an appropriate report on the transac-
tion in question.2 2 1 The bank must immediately inform the customer
and invite him to give evidence and information to the bank within
thirty days.222 The bank then must file its report, including the neces-
sary evidence, with the Commission, not more than forty-five days after
the request was made.2 23 The report must contain the name, address
and nationality of the customer, and his securities transactions during
the forty trading days prior to the announcement of the business acquisi-
216 Id. at Art. 3(1).
217 Id. at Art. 3(2).
218 Id. at Art. 3(3).
219 Article 3(4):
The Commission will be satisfied in all cases where the daily trading volume of
such securities increased 50% or more at any time during the 25 trading days
prior to the announcement of an acquisition or a business combination above the
average daily trading volume of such securities during the period from the 90th
trading day to the 30th trading day prior to such announcement. The Commis-
sion will also be satisfied in cases where the price of such securities varied at least
50% or more during the 25 trading days prior to the announcement of an acquisi-
tion or a business combination above the average daily trading volume of such
securities during the period from the 90th trading day to the 30th trading day
prior to such announcement. The Commission will also be satisfied in cases
where the price of such securities varied at least 50% or more during the 25 trad-
ing days prior to such announcement.
Id. at Art. 3(4).
In III. 3. of the "Memorandum of Understanding," the two countries agreed that the failure by
the SEC to meet the threshold criteria would not result in any presumption that the SEC did
not have reasonable grounds to make the request for assistance. See Memorandum supra note
182, at III. 3.
220 See Agreement, supra note 204, at Art. 3(5). In the "Memorandum of Understanding"
the parties reaffirmed that such information obtained by way of the Memorandum and the
Agreement may not be used in any other proceeding than those for which the information is
granted. The information must not be given to any other administrative body in the United
States, or made public. Switzerland's representatives set a high value on the Principle of Speci-
ality, as expressed in the Treaty. See supra text accompanying note 122.
221 See Agreement, supra note 204, at Art. 4(1).
222 Id. at Art. 4(2). In III. 3. of the "Memorandum of Understanding" the nations agreed
that the failure of a bank customer to provide such material shall not result in any presumption
of guilt. See Memorandum, supra note 182, at III. 3.
223 See Agreement, supra note 204, at Art. 4(3).
[VOL. 9
Swiss BANKING SECRECY
tion or business combination in question. 224 Any materials exonerating
the customer are also furnished to the Commission. 225 In case of doubt
as to the accuracy of the bank's report, the Commission (or later the
SEC) may request the Swiss Federal Banking Commission to scrutinize
the bank's report and, if need be, to correct it.2 2 6
The Commission will furnish a report containing the requested evi-
dence to the Swiss Federal Office for Police Matters, which will forward
it to the SEC, unless the bank's report or the customer's material estab-
lishes to the reasonable satisfaction of the Commission that the cus-
tomer's securities transactions do not constitute insider trading as defined
by the Agreement, 22 7 or that the customer is not an insider as provided
for by the Agreement. 228 If the Commission decides not to release the
material, it must explain its reasons in a report to the Swiss Federal Of-
fice for Police Matters and then to the SEC.
2 2 9
In the Memorandum of Understanding, an additional proviso con-
cerning the transmission of information was made by Switzerland. 230 As
an exception to the general rule, the Commission can refuse to transmit a
report to the SEC if the transmission would cause considerable harm to
third persons, or to essential interests of Switzerland. 23' The report will
be adapted to exclude such harm and the SEC will accept such judg-
ment and use moderation when considering alternative measures.
B. Blocking of the Customer's Account
If the preconditions for the Commission's inquiries are met 232 the
Commission must ask the bank(s) to block the customer's account imme-
diately to the extent of the suspected profit. The bank must place such
amounts in an interest bearing account at the disposal of the Commission
until disposition of the matter by the SEC or U.S. courts.2 33 The Com-
mission will remit the blocked amounts (plus accrued interest) to the
SEC on request if the amount demanded is not higher than the unlawful
224 Id.
225 Id. at Art. 4(4).
226 Id. at Art. 8.
227 Id. at Art. 5(1). This subsection refers to article 3 of the Agreement. It would be more
sensible to refer to article I of the Agreement since the latter defines insider trading while the
former regulates the preconditions of the Commission's inquiries.
228 Id. at Art. 5(2). The location of the definition of who is regarded as an insider is unfor-
tunate. It would have been more reasonable to locate this definition in the very beginning of
the agreement.
In III. 3. of the "Memorandum of Understanding" the countries agreed that if the Com-
mission judges the client not to be an insider as defined by the Agreement, the SEC will accept
the decision and use moderation when considering alternative measures. See Memorandum,
supra note 182, at III. 3.
229 See Agreement, supra note 204, at Art. 7.
230 See Memorandum, supra note 182, at III. 3.
231 Such information would also be withheld under the Treaty. See supra note 121 and
accompanying text.
232 See supra notes 216-20 and accompanying text.
233 See Agreement, supra note 204, at Art. 9(1), 9(2).
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profit, and either the customer consents in writing or the proceedings in
U.S. courts have terminated in a final judgment adverse to the
customer.
234
The sums blocked will be unblocked in the following cases:
(a) If the SEC consents in writing;235
(b) If the proceedings in a U.S. court have terminated in a final
judgment in favor of the customer; 236
(c) If, after the Commission considers the conditions for supplying
the information not to be fulfilled,237 the SEC does not request
that the Swiss Federal Banking Commission scrutinize the
bank's report 238 within thirty days;2 39 or
(d) If the SEC requests the examination of the bank's report but the
Federal Banking Commission does not correct the report within
sixty days, or on the tenth day after a repeated 240 statement re-
fusing to supply the information, is forwarded to the SEC,
whichever is earlier. 24 1
C Various Provisions
The Agreement includes various provisions regarding who the
bank's customers are, the sanctions of the Swiss Bankers' Association
against noncomplying banks, the duration of the Agreement, and the
bank's duty to inform its clients. Under the Agreement, customers in-
clude the beneficial owners of the assets identified in accordance with the
Agreement on the Observance of Care by the Banks in Accepting Funds
and on the Practice of Banking Secrecy.2 42 If a signatory bank violates
the Agreement, the Swiss Bankers' Association will either warn the bank
concerned or, in serious or repeated cases, exclude the bank from the
Agreement.2 43 The Agreement is in force for a fixed three-year period
from January 1, 1983 to December 31, 1985 and will be renewed on a
year to year basis if not terminated by a bank with notice at least six
months in advance.2 44 The Agreement will be repealed if Switzerland
234 Id. at Art. 9(2). A consent in a United States court equals such final judgment.
235 Id. at Art. 9(3)(c).
236 Id. at Art. 9(3)(b). Again a consent in a U.S. court equals such final judgment.
237 See supra note 229 and accompanying text.
238 See supra note 226 and accompanying text.
239 See Agreement, supra note 204, at Art. 9(3)(a)(i).
240 The language of the Agreement is confusing on this point. The provision makes sense
only if the word "repeated" is inserted, since the SEC can only learn of the bank's report by a
first statement (of the Federal Office for Police Matters).
241 See Agreement, supra note 204, at Art. 9(3)(a)(ii).
242 Id. at Art. 6. For a discussion on the Agreement on the Observance of Care by the
Banks in Accepting Funds and on the Practice of Banking Secrecy, see supra notes 57-71 and
accompanying text.
243 d. at Art. 10. Notice hereof will be given to the Swiss Federal Banking Commission
and to the SEC.
244 Id. at Art. 11. In such case the other banks will be free to join such termination.
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enacts legislation declaring insider trading a crime.245 Finally, the
Agreement states that the banks must inform their clients in due form
about the contents of the Agreement.
246
X. Waiver of Confidentiality by the Bank Customers
The Agreement states that "the banks must inform their clients in
due form about the contents of the Agreement. '2 4 7 The Memorandum
provides that "the Agreement will also govern the relationship between
the signatory banks and the clients."' 248 Both statements are incomplete,
however, because they do not emphasize or mention that the customers'
waivers are absolutely indispensable for the proceedings provided for by
the Agreement and approved in the Memorandum. 249 Under Swiss
banking secrecy laws, the client, and not the bank, is the master of the
secret 250 and the secrecy can only be limited either by the will of the
client or by legal regulations.
251
The proceedings provided for by the Agreement conflict with the
principles of banking secrecy. Under the Agreement, the bank must file
a report concerning its customer, whom the SEC suspects of insider trad-
ing, to the Commission, which furnishes the report to the Swiss Federal
Office for Police Matters, to be forwarded to the SEC. 252 These proceed-
ings violate the bank's duty of confidentiality. Because the Agreement is
not a legal limitation of the banking secrecy, but a mere private agree-
ment between the members of the Swiss Bankers' Association, the cus-
tomers' consent to the Agreement, waiving the right of confidentiality to
the necessary extent, must be obtained in advance to guarantee the ap-
plicability of the Agreement in all future cases.253
The banks used three methods to procure the customers' consent to
the Agreement in order to waive the latters' right of confidentiality.
First, the banks asked the customers to consent formally to the Agree-
ment by signature. Second, an implied consent to the Agreement was
presumed if the customer did not react to two successive invitations to
submit to the terms of the Agreement. Third, a client's order to be exe-
cuted on the U.S. securities markets will be considered an implied con-
sent to the Agreement in all cases. The Swiss Bankers' Association
245 Id. The Agreement is not precise enough in declaring any legislation on the misuse of
inside information as generally sufficient to apply the Treaty to future insider transactions,
thereby making the Agreement superfluous.
246 Id. at Art. 12.
247 Id.
248 See supra note 201 and accompanying text. See Memorandum, supra note 182, at III. 2.
249 See supra note 201 and accompanying text.
250 See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
251 See supra Section III.
252 See supra notes 221-31 and accompanying text.
253 To ask a customer for a waiver in a pending case was already common practice before
th Agreement and the Memorandum. See SEC v. Banca Della Suizzera Italiana, 92 F.R.D.
111 (1981).
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ensured that all banks, including nonmembers of the Bankers' Associa-
tion, used the following proceedings to obtain the customers' consent. 254
In general, all clients in possession of securities not issued by the
bank were asked for a waiver, and all future customers who wish to open
a securities deposit will be asked to submit to the Agreement. The banks
sent all customers the text of the Agreement together with a cover letter
containing the following, which was prescribed by the Bankers'
Association:
In connection with an investigation of the SEC concerning misuse of
inside information, the bank may reveal to the SEC the name of the
customer as well as details of the customer's transactions on U.S. securi-
ties markets under certain conditions. Furthermore, the profits resulting
from such transactions may be blocked and remitted to the SEC under
certain conditions. In any case, however, the customer will be enabled
to demonstrate that his transactions were not made in violation of U.S.
inside trading law or that the requirements set forth in the Agreement
are not met. The materials furnished by the client will be examined in
Switzerland by a Commission appointed by the Swiss Bankers' Associa-
tion which is bound by the rule of banking secrecy.
2 5 5
In addition, the clients were furnished a form under which they either
had to accept or reject the Agreement within a specified time. 256 After
lapse of the time fixed in the first letter, the banks sent a second invita-
tion2 57 to all nonresponding clients, together with another Declaration of
254 The following explanations are based on Circular No. 5970 of the Swiss Bankers' Assoc.
of Oct. 19, 1982.
255 See id. at enclosure No. 1.
256 This form had the following text:
Declaration of Acceptance or Rejection of Convention XVI of the Swiss Bankers' Association."
I, the undersigned, have taken due note of Convention XVI of the Swiss Bankers'
Association.
I agree to my name and details of my transactions on the U.S. markets being
revealed to the responsible bodies in any investigation under the terms of this
Convention. I also consent to any balances in my favour which are attributable
to profits made (or losses avoided) through such stock exchange transactions be-
ing temporarily blocked by the bank and being surrendered, if the situation war-
rants it, to the Securities and Exchange Commission in the United States.
I decline explicitly to submit to the terms of Convention XVI. I acknowledge the
fact that no further orders can be executed on my behalf on the U.S. securities
markets. If, after receipt of these documents, I continue to give the bank orders to
be executed on the U.S. securities markets, such instructions may in all cases be
understood to imply that I am in agreement with the regulations contained in





257 The following is a sample of the second (invitation) sent to all non-responding clients:
Re: Exposure of insider transactions on the U.S. stock exchanges
Ladies and gentlemen,
In a circular letter mailed at the end of October 1982 we informed you about the
"Agreement XVI of the Swiss Bankers' Association with regard to the handling of
requests for information from the Securities and Exchange Commission of the
United States on the subject of misuse of inside information." A number of our
clients have not yet returned the form "Declaration of acceptance or rejection"
and we therefore take the liberty to revert to the matter.
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Acceptance or Rejection form. The second invitation stressed that si-
lence on the part of the client would be regarded as an implied con-
sent. 25 The banks will refuse orders to be executed on U.S. securities
markets if given by customers who did not submit to the terms of the
Agreement. If such an order should be executed erroneously, the Decla-
ration of Acceptance or Rejection form provides that the customer's in-
struction may in all cases (i.e. whether the client expressly rejected to
submit to the terms of the Agreement or remained silent) be understood
as an implied consent to the Agreement.
259
XI. Assessment of the Value of the Memorandum
The practical value of the Memorandum of Understanding is specu-
lative. The involved authorities agreed to keep all proceedings under the
Memorandum secret. Nevertheless, there are some significant factors de-
termining the Memorandum's value that can be inferred from the pre-
ceding explanations.
The first prerequisite for the success of the Memorandum is that the
SEC will profit by it. Instead of seeking an order for disclosure in U.S.
courts,260 the SEC must request the information concerned (through the
U.S. Department of Justice) from the Swiss Federal Office for Police
Matters. 261 Since attempts to obtain information in the way used in BSI
are not always successful, 262 the SEC will use the new mechanism in the
future.
Under the Memorandum, information will be furnished to the SEC
according to the terms of the Agreement of the Swiss Bankers' Associa-
tion. 263 The Agreement provides assistance only with respect to insider
trading before the announcement of a significant acquisition or disposi-
tion, 264 such as the acquisitions that gave rise to Santa Fe and BSI. Thus,
in exceptional cases, the requested information might not be available by
way of the Memorandum, though the transactions are considered insider
Please note that the bank will assume, in the absence of either a positive or nega-
tive reaction on the part of the customer by December 31, 1982, that the customer
agrees to the stipulations of "Agreement XVI" of the Swiss Bankers' Association.
Your decision, if negative, is not irrevocable: if you oppose the convention now
you may come back on your decision at a later date. Any orders to be executed
on the American stock markets will be understood to mean that you are willing
forthwith to submit to the terms of the convention.
If you were kind enough in the meantime to forward your reply, we apologize for
having bothered you once more and thank you for your understanding.
Yours sincerely,
CREDIT SUISSE
258 See note 257. Since the Agreement became effective on January 1, 1983, see supra text
accompanying note 206, most banks asked their customers to reply by December 31, 1982.
259 See Declaration of Acceptance or Rejection Form, supra note 256.
260 See supra Section V. for recent SEC procedures.
261 See Memorandum, supra note 182, at III. 1.
262 According to BSI a bank will only be required to reveal information after a careful
evaluation of various factors. See supra notes 98-112 and accompanying text.
263 See Memorandum, supra note 182, at III. 1.
264 See supra note 211 and accompanying text.
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trading in the United States. In addition, it will be possible to find
smaller banks located in Switzerland which did not sign the Agreement.
If those banks decide to trade in United States stock markets the chan-
nels of the Memorandum will not be open to the SEC.
According to the mechanism established by the Memorandum and
the Agreement, a request for information will be delivered by the Federal
Office for Police Matters of Switzerland to the specially created Commis-
sion of Inquiry which will call for an appropriate report from the bank
involved.265 The Commission must then furnish the report concerned to
the Federal Office for Police Matters, to be forwarded to the SEC. The
Commission, however, may refuse to transmit the information if it does
not consider the securities transaction to be insider trading, or the bank
customer to be an insider, as provided for by the Agreement. 26 6 Accord-
ing to the Memorandum, the SEC must accept the Commission's deci-
sion as one made in good faith.26 7
Because the Commission's power to withhold information is thus
unimpeachable, this could theoretically neutralize the value of the Mem-
orandum. Similar doubts also arise because the Commission is not
bound by any rules of procedure and does not have to obey any direc-
tions of Swiss or American authorities. 268
As previously mentioned, 269 information will be transmitted under
the Treaty only in criminal proceedings and where the prosecuted act
would be an offense under Swiss criminal law. Since insider trading is
not sufficiently punishable under Swiss law, 270 it can be assumed that the
SEC will prefer to use the mechanism of the Memorandum and the
Agreement, even where the information might be made available under
the United States-Swiss Treaty on Mutual Assistance in Criminal
Matters.
If Switzerland enacts legislation declaring insider trading a crime,
the required information will be available through the channels of the
Treaty. 271 In case of such insider trading legislation, the Agreement, ac-
265 See supra notes 207-09 and accompanying text.
266 See supra notes 227 & 228 and accompanying text.
267 Set Memorandum, supra note 182, at III. 3. Since article 5 of the Agreement is not very
well drafted the Memorandum refers only to the Commission's judgment regarding the second
question; ze. whether or not the customer is an insider as defined by the Agreement.
268 Because the Commission's current president, Peter Forstmoser (corporations and securi-
ties professor of the University of Zurich Law School) is one of the strongest and best known
defenders of the criminalization of insider trading in Switzerland, such fears of abuse should be
unwarranted.
269 See supra Section VII.
270 See supra notes 158-75 and accompanying text.
271 In October 1983 the Federal Council of Switzerland presented its drafted bill on the
misuse of inside information to the public. The draft provides:
CP. Art. 16/ (new)
Taking Advantage of Confidential Information:
1. Whoever, as a member of the board, an officer, an auditor or an assistant of a
company or of an affiliated company, as a member of a public authority or as a
public officer, or as an assistant of any of them, receives a confidential informa-
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cording to its own provisions, will be abrogated. 2 72 The Memorandum,
however, will not automatically be superseded, but will be valid until the
two countries agree on its termination. 273
The Memorandum should benefit both the United States and Swit-
zerland in most cases. The SEC will use the new mechanism to obtain
the needed information, and the Commission will handle the cases with
the care required. In most cases, information of insider trading on U.S.
stock exchanges through Swiss banks will be transmitted. A problem ex-
ists, however, if non-signatory smaller banks start trading in United
States stock exchanges. Insiders will be able to neutralize the effects of
the Memorandum by choosing those banks which do not require clients
to sign the waiver of confidentiality.
XII. Unsolved Problems
The customer's consent to the Agreement, waiving the right of confi-
dentiality, was procured by banks in different forms, (e.g. an express con-
sent, a consent implied by silence and a consent implied by conduct). 274
Each form of the customer's consent to the Agreement could be chal-
lenged before Swiss courts.
If the customer expressly consented to the Agreement he or she
signed the following text: "I agree to my name and details of my trans-
actions on the U.S. markets being revealed to the responsible bodies in
any investigation under the terms of this Convention. '275 Such a waiver
of confidentiality may be contrary to the Swiss public order and to arti-
cle 27 subsection 2 of the Swiss Civil Code, which provides that no per-
son can alienate his personal liberty nor impose any restrictions on his
own enjoyment thereof which are contrary to law or morality. 276 Be-
cause of the general nature of the customer's waiver, such an argument
could possibly succeed.
The second letter forwarded to the bank customers contained the
following sentence: "Please note that the bank will assume, in the ab-
sence of either a positive or negative reaction on the part of the customer
by. . . (December 31, 1982), that the customer agrees to the stipulations
tion which upon publication is apt to influence materially the stock or outside
market quotation of shares, non-voting-shares or other securities of the company,
and makes a profit by using this information, shall be confined to jail or fined. If
an acquisition of one company is sought by another, sub-paragraphs (1) and (2)
shall be applied to shares, non-voting-shares and other securities of both
companies.
2. Paragraph (1) shall be applied analogously if the confidential information is
used to make a profit with shares, non-voting-shares or other securities of a co-
operative.
272 Stt supra note 245 and accompanying text.
273 Se Memorandum, supra note 182, at IV. 2.b.
274 See supra Section X.
275 See supra note 256.
276 C.C. Art. 27(2).
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of Agreement XVI of the Swiss Bankers' Association. '2 77 Under Swiss
law, silence to an offer usually does not constitute acceptance. Only
where the "particular nature" of a transaction or the "circumstances"
justify it, can an acceptance be inferred from silence. 278 Neither excep-
tion fits the problem involved. The bank's letter, which in effect seeks to
change the contract by releasing the bank from its duty of confidential-
ity, is not in the interest of the customer. Therefore, the transaction is
not of a "particular nature" to justify the inference of an acceptance by
silence.2 79 Arguably, the continuing contractual relationship between
bank and customer constitutes a "circumstance" that justifies the infer-
ence of acceptance by silence.280 The bank customer, however, should
prevail by arguing that the bank's proposal to change the contract was
not within the range of prior negotiations, and that his silence is there-
fore not an acceptance. 28 1
The Declaration of Acceptance or Rejection form that was sent to
the bank's clients contained the following sentence: "If, after receipt of
these documents, I continue to give the bank orders to be executed on the
U.S. securities markets, such instruction may in all cases be understood
to imply that I am in agreement with the regulations contained in Con-
vention XVI of the Swiss Bankers' Association. '2 2 Article 1 subsection 2
of the Swiss Obligation Code provides that a consent can be either ex-
press or implied.28 3 In contrast to silence, affirmative conduct is gener-
ally considered as consent. 28 4 A client's order to his bank, to be executed
on the U.S. stock markets, will probably be regarded as consent, implied
by conduct, to the bank's letter. A client's argument asserting special
circumstances, however, remains reserved. For example, a client may
claim lack of knowledge of the bank's letters because they remained in
the bank to be picked up by the client.
An additional question is what can be done if a signatory bank fails
to comply with the Agreement, either by refusing to furnish the required
information to the Commission 28 5 or by not blocking the customer's ac-
count as requested by the Commission. 286 The SEC, the United States
277 See supra note 257.
278 Article 6 of the Swiss Code of Obligations provides:
Where, due to the particular nature of the transaction, or due to the circum-
stances, express acceptance is not to be expected, the contract is deemed to be
concluded if the offer is not declined within a reasonable time.
C.O. Art. 6.
279 See Kommentar zum Schweizerischen Zivilgesetzbuch. Vol. V. la, Comment 28 to Ar-
ticle 6 (1973).
280 Id at Comment 22 to Article 6.
281 See, e.g., T. GUHL, H. MERZ & M. KUMMER, DAS SCHWEIZERISCHE OBLIGATION-
ENRECHT 98 (1980) [hereinafter cited as GUHL, MERZ & KUMMER].
282 See supra note 256.
283 C.O. Art. 1(2).
284 See GUHL, MERZ & KUMMER, supra note 281, at 88.
285 As provided for by article 4 of the Agreement. See Agreement, supra note 204, at Art. 4.
286 As provided for by article 9 of the Agreement. Id. at Art. 9.
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Department of Justice, the Swiss Federal Office for Police Matters, the
Swiss National Bank, the Swiss Banking Commission and the Commis-
sion created by the Agreement all have an interest in obtaining compli-
ance by the bank. None of the mentioned authorities, however, has a
claim that the bank fulfill its duties under the Agreement, since they are
not all parties of the Agreement. The Agreement is rather a multilateral
contract of the signatory banks, endowing the contracting parties with
the remedies as provided for by Swiss contract law and by the Agreement
itself.
Swiss contract law does not supply the parties with an adequate
remedy. The Swiss Obligation Code states, in its chapter on the conse-
quences of nonperformance, that the breaching party shall compensate
the affected party for the damages arising therefrom. 28 7 Since the re-
maining signatory banks will not suffer any damages if a bank refuses to
give the Commission information or fails to block a customer's account,
the Code's remedy is meaningless. Article 10 of the Agreement, however,
provides that in case of violation of the provisions of the Agreement, the
Board of Directors of the Swiss Bankers' Association (a) shall issue a
warning to the bank responsible; and (b) in serious cases, or where there
is a repetition of a violation, it shall exclude the bank from the Agree-
ment and shall inform the Federal Banking Commission and the SEC
accordingly. 28 Nevertheless, none of the previously listed authorities has
any power to force a bank to comply with the Agreement's procedure. A
bank cannot be forced to furnish information or block a customer's
account.
Another issue is whether the Swiss Federal Office for Police Matters
is bound by the procedure established by the Memorandum and the
Agreement; 11e., whether the Swiss authority can be required to forward
information to the U.S. Department of Justice and to the SEC. The
Agreement cannot require that the Federal Office for Police Matters fur-
nish information to U.S. authorities since a private agreement cannot
oblige third parties. The Memorandum, however, does not expressly
state a general duty of the Swiss authority to pass on to U.S. authorities
the report received by the Commission. Nor does the Memorandum ex-
pressly incorporate the Agreement and its mechanism of transmitting the
information. The Memorandum merely states that the countries entered
into certain understandings with respect to the Agreement 28 9 and repro-
duces the parties' comment to specific points of the Agreement. 290 Re-
garding the duty of the Federal Office for Police Matters to transmit the
bank's report, the Memorandum states that the Swiss authority can
withhold information if essential interests, either of Switzerland or of a
287 For the text of Art. 97(1) of the Swiss Obligation Code, see supra note 16.
288 See Agreement, supra note 204, at Art. 10.
289 See Memorandum, supra note 182, at I. 7.
290 Id. at III.
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third person, are at stake, and that the SEC will regard this opinion as
one made in good faith.291 If the Swiss authority refuses to pass on the
information for different reasons than those mentioned in the Memoran-
dum, the Federal Office for Police Matters might argue that in the Mem-
orandum there is no specific duty according to which the Swiss authority
must transmit the information.
Apart from such objection, the enforceability of the Memorandum
is problematical. It was not signed on behalf of the President of the
United States and the Swiss Federal Council, but rather on behalf of the
governments of the respective countries. Therefore, the Memorandum is
not a binding treaty to be ratified by both the United States President
and the Swiss Federal Council.2 9 2 An interview with Edward F. Greene,
General Counsel of the SEC and member of the American delegation in
the regarding negotiations, affirms this argument. According to Mr.
Greene, "A memorandum of understanding is a statement of intent be-
tween two governments, not a binding agreement. ' '2 9 3 The Swiss Fed-
eral Office for Police Matters could thus refuse to transmit to the U.S.
Department of Justice a bank's report, basing its refusal on two argu-
ments: (1) that the Memorandum does not state such a duty; and (2)
even if it did, the Memorandum is not a binding treaty.
Apart from the unsolved legal problems arising from the Memoran-
dum of Understanding with Switzerland, the United States faces a more
serious future problem. Once insider transactions are made more diffi-
cult through Swiss banks, they will be conducted by way of other foreign
banks, such as those of Liechtenstein, Panama or the Caribbean. 294 The
United States should therefore prepare statements similar to the Memo-
randum with other countries having bank secrecy laws.
XIII. Conclusion
Because of the Memorandum of Understanding, the Swiss banking
291 Section III. 3 of the Memorandum states:
The parties understand that there may be instances in which the Federal Office
for Police Matters may determine that a report submitted by a bank pursuant to
the terms of the private Agreement may not be transmitted to the SEC without
considerable harm either to the essential interests of Switzerland or to third per-
sons who appear to have no relationship to the offense which gave rise to the
request for assistance. In such cases, it is understood that the Federal Office for
Police Matters will use its best efforts to adapt the report so that useful informa-
tion may be provided to the SEC without causing such harm to the interests of
third persons or to Switzerland. In the same spirit, it is understood that the SEC
will judge this opinion as one made in good faith and use moderation when con-
sidering alternative measures.
Id. at III. 3.
292 See Internattonal Agreements, supra note 205, at 442.
293 Greene, supra note 85, at 12, col. 1, n.1.
294 See Peeki g into those Vaults, TIME, Sept. 13, 1982, at 78. Luxembourg and Austria are
other countries the banks of which are used for insider trading in the first place. Translations of
many foreign secrecy laws can be found in: CRIME AND SECRECY: THE USE OF OFFSHORE
BANKS AND COMPANIES, PERMANENT SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS, COMMITTEE ON
GOVERMENTAL AFFAIRS, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., Appendix (Comm. Print 1983).
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secrecy can be superseded in most investigations concerning insider trad-
ing in United States securities markets, and the required information will
be furnished to the SEC. The potential impact of the Memorandum of
Understanding is so promising that similar arrangements are being pre-
pared between the United States and other countries. 29 5 The Memoran-
dum, however, is not a cure-all for stopping illegal insider trading since
the legal framework of the Memorandum could be challenged in many
respects. In addition, insider trading will still be possible in America by
interposing other foreign banks and smaller Swiss banks which did not
join the Agreement of the Swiss Bankers' Association.
295 See, e.g., Hill, Caymans Case Shows How Courts in US. are Cracking the Secrec of Foreign
Banks, Wall St. J., Oct. 14, 1982, § 2, 33, col. 4, at 40; Thomas, Securities Regulators Grapple with
Extraterritoriality, Legal Times, Jan. 17, 1983, 20, col. 1, at 24, col. 4.
1983]
N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
APPENDIX A
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA
THE GOVERNMENT OF SWITZERLAND
MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING
I. Introduction
1. This MOU is a statement of intent setting forth the understandings
reached by the delegations of Switzerland and the United States acting
on behalf of their respective governments ("the parties") to establish mu-
tually acceptable means for improving international law enforcement co-
operation in the field of insider trading. These understandings continue
a long tradition of law enforcement cooperation between Switzerland
and the United States and were reached in the course of consultations
between representatives of Switzerland and the United States in Bern on
March 1 and 2, 1982, and in Washington, D.C. on August 30 and 31,
1982. The Swiss delegation was headed by Minister Jean Zwahlen, head
of the Economic and Financial Section of the Federal Department of
Foreign Affairs, and included other representatives of the said depart-
ment, Lutz Krauskopf, Deputy Chief of Division, and Lionel Frei, Chief
of Section, in the Federal Department of Justice and Police, and repre-
sentatives of the Federal Banking Commission and the Swiss National
Bank. The delegation of the United States included John M. Fedders,
Director of the Division of Enforcement of the Securities and Exchange
Commission ("SEC"); Edward F. Greene, General Counsel of the SEC;
other representatives of the SEC, Roger M. Olsen, Deputy Assistant At-
torney General, Criminal Division, Department of Justice; John R.
Crook, Assistant Legal Adviser for Economic and Business Affairs, De-
partment of State; and other representatives of the Department of State
and the Department of Justice.
2. The consultations included a discussion of concerns in both countries
with respect to recent cases involving persons who used Swiss banks as
intermediaries to effect securities transactions in the United States, at a
time when such persons may have possessed material nonpublic informa-
tion concerning the securities involved. Trading while in possession of
material nonpublic information (insider trading) confers an unfair ad-
vantage upon persons who engage in such trading and impairs the integ-
rity of United States capital markets. Such conduct is a violation of the
United States securities laws and insofar as it is not yet per se punishable
under Swiss law is considered dishonorable in Switzerland as well.
3. The parties noted that, when it appears that a securities transaction
has been made by persons while in possession of material nonpublic in-
formation, the SEC is responsible for conducting an investigation of the
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matter. This requires that the SEC be able to learn the identity of the
person on whose behalf the transaction was effected and other relevant
information. However, Swiss law prohibits banks in principle from dis-
closing information with respect to a customer utilizing its services.
4. The parties concluded that the conduct of persons who utilize Swiss
banks to effect securities transactions in the United States, in order to
take advantage of material nonpublic information, is detrimental to the
interests of both nations.
5. On the basis of the foregoing consultations, the parties reaffirmed the
two countries' interest in mutual assistance in law enforcement matters
in accordance with mutually acceptable procedures and in conformity
with international and national law, in particular assistance with respect
to transactions effected by persons in possession of material nonpublic
information.
6. During the consultations the parties engaged in an exchange of opin-
ions pursuant to Article 39, paragraph 1 of the Treaty Between the
United States and the Swiss Confederation on Mutual Assistance in
Criminal Matters, which became effective on January 23, 1977 (the
"1977 Treaty"). Section II of this Memorandum of Understanding me-
morializes the exchange of opinions and related understandings that the
parties have reached.
7. The parties also entered into certain understandings with respect to
a private Agreement Among Members of the Swiss Bankers' Association,
which is discussed in Section III of this Memorandum of Understanding
and is attached hereto.
II. Exchange of Opinions Regarding the Treaty Between the United
States and the Swiss Confederation on Mutual Assistance
in Criminal Matters
1. The parties note the importance of the 1977 Treaty which provides
for cooperation between law enforcement authorities in connection with
investigations or court proceedings involving criminal offenses, including
fraud. Such cooperation may include assistance in locating witnesses,
obtaining statements and testimony of witnesses, production and authen-
tication of judicial or business records and service of judicial or adminis-
trative documents.
2. The 1977 Treaty has been used on numerous occasions by the law
enforcement authorities of both nations. The parties understand that the
1977 Treaty provides an important means of obtaining information
needed to enforce the criminal or penal laws of each nation and should
be used to the extent feasible.
3. The parties hereby exchange opinions, pursuant to Article 39, para-
graph 1, of the 1977 Treaty concerning the interpretation, application or
operation of that Treaty:
a. Article 1, paragraph 1 of the 1977 Treaty provides that the Con-
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tracting Parties undertake to afford each, in accordance with
provisions of the Treaty, mutual assistance in "investigations or
court proceedings in respect of offenses the punishment of which
falls or would fall within the jurisdiction of the judicial authori-
ties of the requesting State or a state or canton thereof." This
means, for example, that an investigation by the SEC should be
considered an investigation for which assistance could be fur-
nished (if the other requirements of the Treaty are met) as long
as the investigation relates to conduct which might be dealt
with by the criminal courts.
b. The 1977 Treaty requires that a particular offense be a crime
under the laws of each nation in order for compulsory assistance
to be required under the Treaty. The parties understand that
transactions effected by persons in possession of material non-
public information could be an offense under Articles 148
(fraud), 159 (unfaithful management) or 162 (violation of busi-
ness secrets) of the Swiss Penal Code. As a result, the parties
understand that it will often be possible for compulsory meas-
ures to be ordered under the Treaty in obtaining information
from the banks that executed the securities transactions in the
United States that are the subject of the request for assistance.
4. Paragraph 3 of Article 1 of the 1977 Treaty provides that, "The com-
petent authorities of the Contracting Parties may agree that assistance as
provided by this Treaty will also be granted in certain ancillary adminis-
trative proceedings in respect of measures which may be taken against
the perpretrator of an offense falling within the purview of this Treaty."
The laws of both parties provide for administrative and judicial proceed-
ings in which sanctions and remedies are available other than prison
sentences and fines imposed in criminal prosecutions. The parties have
agreed in principle to an exchange of diplomatic notes to facilitate the
application of the 1977 Treaty to such ancillary administrative proceed-
ings in cases of offense covered by the Treaty and relating to trading by
persons in possession of material nonpublic information. Moreover, the
parties undertake to consider whether comparable diplomatic notes
should be exchanged with -respect to other offenses relating to securities
transactions covered by the Treaty.
IIl. The Private Agreement Among Members of the Swiss Bankers'
Association
1. The parties recognize that there may be securities transactions ef-
fected in the United States by Swiss banks acting on behalf of persons
who possess material nonpublic information, for which compulsory
measures would not be available under the 1977 Treaty. Such assistance
could not be ordered if available information did not indicate the exist-
ence of an offense under the Swiss Penal Code. As the Swiss Federal
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Council will submit to the Parliament a bill on the misuse of inside infor-
mation, this lacuna could be filled. For cases in which the Treaty is not
applicable, or in which it is not possible to gather evidence by employing
compulsory process, pending the enactment of such legislation, the par-
ties discussed a proposed private Agreement under the aegis of the Swiss
Bankers' Association, which would permit participating banks to disclose
the identity of a customer and certain other relevant information, under
certain specified circumstances, in response to a request made by the De-
partment of Justice on behalf of the SEC and processed through the Fed-
eral Office for Police Matters. It would also contain certain safeguards
regarding protection of customers and the sovereignty of Switzerland.
2. The said "Agreement with regard to the handling of requests for in-
formation from the SEC on the subject of misuse of inside information"
which is annexed to the present memorandum will be submitted for sig-
nature by the Swiss Bankers' Association to those of the banks located in
Switzerland which may trade in the United States securities markets.
This agreement will also govern the relationship between the signatory
banks and the clients placing orders with the signatory banks for execu-
tion in the United States securities markets.
3. As regards specific points of the private Agreement, the parties came
to the following understanding:
- The private Agreement establishes certain criteria for volume and
price changes in the period preceding an Announcement which, if
met, shall satisfy the Commission of Enquiry that the SEC has
reasonable grounds to request assistance under the terms of the
private Agreement and this Memorandum of Understanding.
The parties understand that these thresholds are set at high levels
because they are intended to define the circumstances under
which the Commission of Enquiry "shall" be satisfied that the
SEC has reasonable grounds to make the request. In all other
cases in which the criteria are not met, the parties understand
that the Commission of Enquiry will be required to review the
information submitted by the SEC to decide whether it is reason-
ably satisfied that the SEC has reasonable grounds to make a re-
quest. Accordingly, the the parties understand that a failure by
the SEC to meet the threshold criteria specified in the private
Agreement shall not result in any presumption of guilt.
- The parties understand that information obtained through the
mechanism established by this memorandum and the private
Agreement will be used or introduced as evidence only in admin-
istrative or judicial proceedings brought by the SEC or Depart-
ment of Justice relating to trading by persons in possession of
material nonpublic information, and may not be used or intro-
duced as evidence in any other proceeding.
- The parties understand that information obtained through the
mechanism established by this memorandum and private Agree-
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ment shall be kept to the fullest extent compatible with constitu-
tional or legal requirements from disclosure to any other
administrative body in the United States or to the public, except
to the extent necessary for administrative or judicial purposes of
the specific case. Each party understands that the other will use
its best efforts to assert legal rights to prevent disclosure of such
information other than as authorized by this memorandum or the
private Agreement.
- If the Commission of Enquiry arrives at the conclusion that a cli-
ent is not an insider as defined by the private Agreement, the
SEC will judge this opinion as one made in good faith, use mod-
eration and take into account the existence of this memorandum
and the private Agreement when considering alternative
measures.
- The parties understand that there may be instances in which the
Federal Office for Police Matters may determine that a report
submitted by a bank pursuant to the terms of the private Agree-
ment may not be transmitted to the SEC without considerable
harm either to the essential interests of Switzerland or to third
persons who appear to have no relationship to the offense which
gave rise to the request for assistance. In such cases, it is under-
stood that the Federal Office for Police Matters will use its best
efforts to adapt the report so that useful information may be pro-
vided to the SEC without causing such harm to the interests of
third persons or to Switzerland. In the same spirit, it is under-
stood that the SEC will judge this opinion as one made in good
faith and use moderation when considering alternative measures.
IV. Further Consultations
1. In order to continue and improve international law enforcement co-
operation in a manner consistent with the interests of both nations, the
parties understand that the SEC and the Federal Office for Police Mat-
ters will undertake further contacts or consultations in the future when
the need to do so is recognized mutually.
2. There will be contacts or consultations between the parties concern-
ing the following matters:
a. The parties understand that the SEC will exercise its best ef-
forts to inform appropriate Swiss authorities when an investiga-
tion has been initiated with respect to transactions effected by a
Swiss bank. Further communications will occur, as appropriate,
as an investigation proceeds in order to assure that the interests
of both nations are protected. Such contacts or consultations
may be related to requests for assistance on behalf of the SEC
under the 1977 Treaty or the private Agreement. The parties
understand that the Government of Switzerland will use its
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best efforts to assure that the information obtained in such
communications will not be disclosed to any person except in
connection with a request for assistance by the SEC or an inves-
tigation or enforcement action conducted by Swiss authorities,
and to handle such information with appropriate care to pre-
vent it from becoining known to the bank customer or custom-
ers involved.
b. At the termination of the private Agreement, the parties will
consult regarding experience under the private Agreement and
the 1977 Treaty as well as the effect of such termination on this
memorandum.
c. The parties agree that any questions or disputes between them
with respect to the interpretation or application of this "Memo-
randum of Understanding," the exchange of opinions included
herein pursuant to Article 39, paragraph 1, of the 1977 Treaty
or the operation of the private Agreement shall be settled by
means of consultations.
V. Other
1. Notwithstanding any other provision herein, the parties agree that
this Memorandum does not modify or supersede any laws or regulations
in force in the United States or Switzerland.
2. The parties agree that they do not intend to confer any right on any
customer of a bank which is a signatory of the private Agreement to
judicial review in the courts of the United States with respect to any
decision to disclose information to United States' authorities under the
terms of the private Agreement.
3. The parties understand that the Swiss Bankers' Association will use
its best efforts promptly to obtain the signatures of the banks concerned
and to keep the SEC informed through the Federal Office for Police
Matters of the banks which are signatories to the private Agreement.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the respective representatives, duly au-
thorized for this purpose, have signed this "Memorandum of
Understanding."
Done at Washington, D.C., in duplicate this 31st day of August,
1982.
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On behalf of the
Government of







On behalf of the
Government of Switzerland
Jean Zwahlen, Minister








of the Swiss Bankers' Association with regard to the handling of requests
for information from the Securities and Exchange Commission of the
United States on the subject of misuse of inside information.
Preamble
In consideration of the inquiries from the Securities and Exchange
Commission (hereafter: SEC) of the United States on the misuse of in-
side information and so far as the banks cannot be obliged to furnish
information to the appropriate Swiss authorities for submission to the
SEC in a legal assistance procedure, the member banks of the present
Agreement (hereafter: the banks) undertake to respect the following
stipulations:
Article 1
If within 25 trading days prior to a public announcement ("Announce-
ment") of
(A) - a proposed merger, consolidation, sale of substantially all of an is-
suer's assets or other similar business combination ("Business Combina-
tin ") or
(B) - the proposed acquisition of at least 10% of the securities of an issuer
by open market purchase, tender offer or otherwise ("Acquisition"), a cus-
tomer gives to a bank an order to be executed in the U.S. securities mar-
kets for the purchase or sale of securities or put or call options for
securities of any company that is party to a Business Combinatzn or the
subject of an Acquisthon ("Company"), the bank, upon an inquiry by the
Federal Office for Police Matters ("Inquiry"), shall disclose to the appro-
priate authorities pursuant to this Agreement the information stipulated
under Article 4 thereof when:
a) the U.S. Department of Justice on behalf of the SEC or itself has
sent to the Federal Office for Police Matters written application in
connection with a formal investigation concerning a possible viola-
tion of the U.S. inside trading laws in connection with the Acquisition
or Business Combination; and
b) the provisions of Articles 3 et seq. of this Agreement are met.
Article 2
1. The Board of Directors of the Swiss Bankers' Association shall ap-
point a Commission of inquiry (the "Commission") composed of three
members and three deputies. Neither the members of the Commission
nor their deputies may exercise an executive function in a company
which is subject to the Federal Law on Banks and Savings Banks.
2. As selected representatives of the banks in accordance with Article
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47, paragraph 1, of the Federal Law on Banks and Savings Banks, the
members of the Commission, their deputies and staff are bound by the rule
of banking secrecy for all the facts of which they are apprised in the
course of the procedure set out by the present Agreement.
3. The Commission shall be domiciled at the office of the Swiss Bankers'
Association.
4. The Commission shall organize its own secretariat.
Article 3
The Commission shall handle the Inquiries when
1. the Inquiry is transmitted to it by the Federal Office for Police Mat-
ters and is based upon the written application referred to in Article 1 (a)
hereof;
2. the Inquzir is accompanied by documentation and by a confirmation
from the U.S. Department of Justice or the SEC that it will place at the
Commission's disposal all evidence or appropriate summaries thereof ma-
terially relevant to the Inquiry in its possession which it is free to reveal;
3. the Inquiry is accompanied by specific 'identification of the transac-
tions of the Company's securities or put or call options therefore made
within 25 trading days prior to the Announcement of the Acquisition or Busi-
ness Combination;
4. the SEC has established to the reasonable satisfaction of the Commis-
sion that (i) material price or volume movements have occurred with
respect to trading in the securities which are the subject of the Acquisthon
or Business Combination during the 25 day period prior to its Announcement
or (ii) it has other material indications that the transactions referred to in
3. above were made in violation of U.S insider trading laws. The Commis-
sion shall be satisfied in all cases in which the daily trading volume of
such securities increased 50% or more at any time during the 25 trading
days prior to such Announcement above the average daily trading volume
of such securities during the period from the 90th trading day to the 30th
trading day prior to such Announcement or the price of such securities va-
ried at least 50% or more during the 25 trading days prior to such An-
nouncement. In all other cases, the Commission shall review the information
submitted by the SEC to decide whether it is reasonably satisfied that the
SEC has reasonable grounds to make the Inquiiy;
5. the Inquiy is accompanied by an undertaking by the SEC not to
disclose the information to be provided pursuant to Article 4.3 to any
person except in connection with an SEC investigation or a law enforce-
ment action initiated by the SEC against alleged purchasers or sellers of
the Companys securities or put or call options therefore for violations of





1. The Commission shall promptly call for an appropriate report from
the banks on the transactions concerned.
2. Upon receipt of such call, the bank shall immediately inform the
customer and invite him to furnish the bank, within 30 days after dis-
patch of the bank's communication, all evidence and information which,
in the customer's opinion, are apt to demonstrate that the customer's
transactions were not made in violation of U.S. insider trading laws in
connection with the Acquisition or Business Combination or that the require-
ments set forth in this Agreement are not met.
3. The bank shall file its report, together with all useful evidence, with
the Commission as a rule within 45 days after receipt of the Inquiry. The
report shall in particular state
a) name, address and nationality of the customer, and
b) all details of the customer's transactions in the securities or call
options for the securities of the Company during 40 trading days
preceding the Announcement.
4. Together with the report, the bank shall file with the Commission all
materials received from the customer.
5. If the Commission needs further information for the sake of the Inquiy,
it will approach the SEC through the Federal Office for Police Matters.
Article 5
The Commission shall furnish to the Federal Office for Police Matters a
report containing the evidence requested in the Inqui, to be forwarded
to the SEC, unless the bank's report or the customer establishes to rea-
sonable satisfaction of the Commission that
1. he is not an entity or individual which placed one of the specific
purchases or sales identified by the SEC pursuant to Article 3 hereof;
2. or that he is not an insider under the following definition
a) a member of the board, an officer, an auditor or a mandated per-
son of the Company or an assistant of any of them; or
b) a member of a public authority or a public officer who in the
execution of his public duty received information about an Acqui-
sition or a Business Combination,- or
c) a person who on the basis of information about an Acquisition or a
Business Combination received from a person described in 2. a) or b)
above has been able to act for the latter or to benefit himself from
inside information.
Article 6
The customer, within the meaning of Articles 2 to 5 hereof, includes
the beneficial owner of the assets identified in accordance with the
Articles 3 to 6 of the Agreement of 1st July, 1982 on the observance
of care by the banks in accepting funds and on the practice of bank-
ing secrecy.
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Article 7
If the conditions for the supply of information to the SEC are not
fulfilled, the Commission shall deliver to the Federal Office for Police
Matters a report, to be forwarded to the SEC, explaining the reasons.
Article 8
In the case of any doubt arising as to the material accuracy of the
report furnished by the bank, the Commiszin by itself or the SEC,
through the appropriate channels, may request the Federal Banking
Commission to examine whether the report given conforms to the
facts and to the present Agreement. The bank shall provide all in-
formation needed for examination. If any material inaccuracy is dis-
covered, an amended report showing the correct information shall be
forwarded to the Federal Office for Police Matters, to be forwarded
to the SEC. Any other appropriate measures of the Federal Banking
Commission in accordance with the provisions of the Law on Banks
and Savings Banks are reserved.
Article 9
1. If the criteria of Article 1 (a) and Article 3 are fulfilled, the bank,
at the Commission's notice shall immediately block the customer's ac-
count, to the extent of a sum equivalent to the profit (or the loss
avoided). The amounts blocked shall be held by the bank pending
disposition of the matter by the SEC or U.S. courts.
2. The bank undertakes to place such amounts to be held in an
interest bearing account at the disposal of the Commission. The latter
will remit such amounts, plus accrued interest, to the SEC on re-
quest, if
a) the amount demanded is not higher than the unlawful profit,
and either
b) the proceedings in a U.S. court have terminated in a final
judgment, by consent or otherwise, adverse to the customer,
or
c) the customer consents in writing.
3. Any sums blocked pursuant to Article 9.1 hereof shall be un-
blocked if
a) (i) no request pursuant to Article 8 hereof is received, on the
thirteenth day after the Federal Office for Police Matters
forwards to the SEC the Commission's report pursuant to
Article 7, or
(ii) request for review pursuant to Article 8 hereof is received,
on the sixtieth day after the date of receipt of such inquiry
where no amended report pursuant to Article 8 hereof has
been issued, or on the tenth day after the date any report
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under Article 7 which has been issued is forwarded to the
SEC, whichever is earlier, or
b) the proceedings in a U.S. court have terminated in a final
judgment, by consent or otherwise, not adverse to the cus-
tomer, or
c) the SEC consents in writing.
4. The evidentiary proof concerning the conditions listed under 2
a), b) and c) and 3 a), b) and c) hereof shall be communicated
through the Federal Office for Police Matters.
Article 10
In the case of violation of the provisions of this present Agreement,
the Board of Directors of the Swiss Bankers' Association
a) shall issue a warning to the bank responsible; and
b) in serious cases or where there is repetition of a violation it
shall exclude the bank from the Agreement, and shall inform
the Federal Banking Commission and the SEC accordingly.
Article 11
The Agreement is in force for a fixed period of three years as from 1st
January, 1983. It shall be thereafter renewed on a year to year basis
if not terminated by one of its members by giving advance notice of
at least six months addressed to the Swiss Bankers' Association. In
the case of its being terminated, all parties to the Agreement must be
informed thereof without delay; they then have the right, within a
month from that date,-to become a party to such termination even
when there is no longer six months to run up to the expiration of the
termination term. The Agreement shall remain in force and effect
for those members who have not terminated it.
The Agreement will be abrogated in the case of the Swiss legislature
enacting legislation on the misuse of inside information.
In the case of the Agreement being abrogated, proceedings already
instituted with the Federal Office for Police Matters will be carried
through to settlement.
Article 12
The banks undertake to inform their clients in due form about the
contents of the present Agreement.
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